USMC voluntary separation incentive and special separation benefit: who's leaving?  A focus on quality. by Hemleben, John Frederick
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1993-03
USMC voluntary separation incentive and special
separation benefit: who's leaving?  A focus on quality.
Hemleben, John Frederick









Ouol't reoortinq Ouraen 'or this collection of information is -?st:matea to j.eraqe i nour oer 'esDOnse nciudmg the time tor reviewing instructions, searcning enstmg aata sources
gatherma and maintaining the data needed ana comoietinq jna reviewing the collection ot information Sena comments regaraing this Ouraen estimate or anv jther ^soect of this
collection ot information, nc'uamg suggestions tor reducing this ouraen to Washington Heaaauarters Services. Directorate tor ntormation ODerations ana Reoorts. 12 15 ^etferson
Davis Highway, Suite 1204 Arlington, va 22202-4302 and to the Office of Management ana Budget P^oerwor* Reduction ProiecT 10704-0188). Washington, DC 20503
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE
Mnirh L223
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
USMC VOLUNTARY SEPARATION INCENTIVE AND
SPECIAL SEPARATION BENEFIT: WHO'S LEAVING?









9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/ MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)
An attempt was made to determine what categories of Marines took the fiscal year 1992 (FY92)
Voluntary Separation Incentive/Special Separation Benefit (VSI/SSB) programs. This thesis has the
specific focus of determining whether quality Marines have been unintentionally targeted by the
VSI/SSB policy. Data taken from the Headquarters Master File (HMF) and from the Performance
Evaluation System, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC) were used for multivariate econometric
modeling and bivariate data profiling. Variables created from the data represented proxies for
behavioral variables found in prior studies of job turnover and military careerist retention. Empirical
evidence is presented reflecting consistencies between the two quantitative analyses. This evidence offers
insight into new approaches for future research or for policy redesign.
14. SUBJECT TERMS
Quit Behavior, Separation Bonus, Downsizing, Job Turnover, VSI, SSB, Career
Intent












20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
UL
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 PPGORPP Standard Form 298 (Rev 2-89)Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
USMC Voluntary Separation Incentive and Special
Separation Benefit: Who's Leaving? A Focus on Quality
by
John Frederick ^emleben
Major, United States Marine Corps
B.S., Iowa State University, 1976
emitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of





An attempt was made to determine what categories of
Marines took the fiscal year 1992 (FY92) Voluntary Separation
Incentive/Special Separation Benefit (VSI/SSB) programs. This
thesis has the specific focus of determining whether quality
Marines have been unintentionally targeted by the VSI/SSB
policy. Data taken from the Headquarters Master File (HMF)
and from the Performance Evaluation System, Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps (HQMC) were used for multivariate econometric
modeling and bivariate data profiling. Variables created from
the data represented proxies for behavioral variables found in
prior studies of job turnover and military careerist
retention. Empirical evidence is presented reflecting
consistencies between the two quantitative analyses. This
evidence offers insight into new approaches for future






C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 4
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 4
E. METHODOLOGY 5
F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 7
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 8
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 9
A. INTRODUCTION 9
B. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIES OF JOB TURNOVER .... 10
1. The Price Model 11
2. The Mobley Model 13
3. The Bluedorn Model 16
4. The Jackofsky Model 18
5. Related Research 21
C. U.S. MILITARY RETENTION STUDIES 22
1. Quality/Performance Variables and
Measures 23
2. Effects of Various Variables on Retention . 24
D. ORGANIZATIONAL DOWNSIZING 28
1. Early Retirement 28
2. General Concerns About the Downsizing
Environment 31
IV
E. CONCLUSION 3 3
III. METHODOLOGY 3 5
A. INTRODUCTION 3 5
B. VARIABLE SPECIFICATION 3 8
1. Focus Variables 38
2. Control Variables 44
C. MODEL SPECIFICATION 55
1. The Heckman Procedural Model 55
2. The Main Logistic Model 58
IV. PRESENTATION OF DATA COLLECTED 61
V. DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 72
A. INTRODUCTION 72
B. MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION 72
C. SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 80
D. SUMMARY 93
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 95
A. INTRODUCTION 9 5
B. RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 96
1. Question 1 96
2. Question 2 99
C. WEAKNESSESS OF THE STUDY 102
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 103
APPENDIX A MARINE CORPS FITNESS REPORT (1610) .... 107
APPENDIX B LARGE SAMPLE FREQUENCIES 109
APPENDIX C SMALL SAMPLE FREQUENCIES 127
APPENDIX D RESULTS OF LINEAR PROBABILITY OLS
REGRESSION MODELS 144
V
APPENDIX E HECKMAN MODEL CROSS -TABULATION TABLES . . . 149
APPENDIX F MAIN MODEL CROSS-TABULATION TABLES .... 157
APPENDIX G LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS (MAIN MODEL) . . . 173
LIST OF REFERENCES 177




The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently conducting a
historically unique draw-down. It is attempting to reduce its
military force roughly 25% and possibly further under the
Clinton administration. Following the end of the Cold War,
DOD now finds itself confronted by huge budgetary constraints
imposed by a Congress determined to reduce federal deficit
spending through the cutting of its largest discretionary
account, DOD.
In response, DOD has begun implementing a downsizing
strategy designed to reduce an all-volunteer military force,
something never before accomplished by U.S. military manpower
planners. From the lessons learned from corporate downsizing
and from some of its own lessons learned during reductions-in-
force (RIFS) in the post World War II era, both the reduction
goals and the attitudes of those in the armed services were
considered.
DOD was forced to deal with Congressional concerns not
only over a reduced threat following the dissolution of the
former Soviet Union, but also over domestic economic problems.
Faced with both issues, DOD adopted several policies in its
downsizing strategy. Reductions would be achieved through
reductions in accessions, normal attrition, involuntary
retirement/selected-early retirement boards (SERBs) , and
pecuniary voluntary-separation incentives. Involuntary
separations (RIFS) were considered as a last resort to be used
by individual services if needed. These reductions would
decrease DOD expenditures and shape the force for possible
alterations in mission requirements. The Department of
Defense has adopted the Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI)
and Special Separation Benefit (SSB) programs, authorized by
the 1992 National Defense Authorization Act, as major policy
tools in its current strategy to downsize or reduce the
Department's strength [Ref. 1].
The Marine Corps has subsequently implemented these DOD
incentives for the explicit purpose of downsizing through
force shaping. Its desire was and is to reduce its force from
193,000 to 159,000 by 1997 through reduced accessions, normal
attrition, and, of interest here, separation incentives such
as the VSI/SSB program. The VSI/SSB program will be used to
shape the force by reducing numbers within military occupa-
tional specialties (MOSs) characterized by promotion
stagnation and by eliminating MOSs for which equipment or
mission no longer exist. 1 In other words, the Marine Corps
is shaping the force to anticipated requirements.
A major concern within the Marine Corps is whether it is
losing a disproportionate number of quality Marines through
telephone interview with Captain Jeffery Peterson USMC,
Enlisted Career Force Planning Officer, Manpower Plans Division,
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C.
these incentive programs. Another concern is, are there any
important trends, i.e., any occupational groupings, duty
stations, etc., that are being disproportionately represented
by those taking the VSI/SSB bonuses? In other words, has the
Marine Corps unknowingly targeted quality or other unintended
populations?
Even though the Marine Corps initially targeted small
populations with restrictive eligibility requirements, it has
expanded the scope now to include a majority of occupational
fields in the Marine Corps [Ref. 2]. Refinement in targeting
populations for subsequent offerings of the VSI/SSB may need
to be accomplished.
B. OBJECTIVES
This study has three primary objectives. The first is to
determine who the Marine Corps is targeting of those eligible
Marines in grades E5 to E7, through the VSI/SSB program. The
major focus concerns quality Marines as defined in terms of
seven quantifyable variables. Secondly, the study seeks to
determine which factors best explain a Marine's decision to
take the VSI/SSB. Finally, using a readily accessible, pre-
existing data set, the study will identify statistically
significant, theoretically-feasible results, if any exist.
These three objectives will be the theme throughout this
thesis.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The three objectives may be formulated as one major
research question with four subsidiary questions.
The primary research question which becomes the focus of
this thesis and appears vitally important to Marine Corps
manpower planners is this: Are a disproportionate number of
quality Marines taking the VSI/SSB voluntary separation
bonuses? The four subsidiary questions are: (1) What are
some "quality variables" to proxy the quality characteristics
of enlisted careerist Marines? (2) What "control variables"
should be used to best account for other factors affecting a
Marine's decision to take/not take a VSI/SSB bonus? (3) What
may be the effect of the quality variables on the probability
that a careerist Marine will take a VSI/SSB bonus? (4) Of
those Marines taking VSI/SSB, do trends appear in their
attribute (variable) profile and, if so, what are those trends
and their effect on the probability a Marine takes a VSI/SSB
bonus?
The answers to these questions can be found in Chapters
III, V, and VI.
D. SCOPE OF THESIS
Essentially this thesis will attempt to confirm or deny
whether the Marine Corps is losing a disproportionate amount
of its quality career enlisted force through the VSI/SSB
programs. The author will use data from Headquarters, Marine
Corps (HQMC) , of those Sergeants (E5) through Gunnery
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Sergeants (E7) who were eligible for VSI/SSB in fiscal year
(FY) 1992. An attempt will be made to explore a number of
focus variables or attributes that may best proxy quality
characteristics of careerist Marines. These variables coupled
with several control variables/attributes will be included in
a multivariate analysis that will aid in the determination of
the effect these quality and control variables may have on
whether a Marine takes either of the two existing voluntary-
separation incentive-bonus programs. A bivariate analysis of
those taking the bonus will also be conducted using the
population of FY92 eligibles.
It is not the purpose to develop a forecasting model to
determine who will take this program, but to explain who has
taken the program, over the FY92 Phase I-III offerings. 2 The
focus is on quality Marines with a secondary emphasis on
statistically significant control variables which may identify
other unintended groupings of Marines, inadvertently targeted
by the VSI/SSB voluntary separation policy.
E . METHODOLOGY
The methodology used was derived from prior research in
both organizational behavior theory of job turnover and from
studies of military retention. This prior research combined
with corporate downsizing research is reviewed in Chapter II.
The theory discussed in Chapter II provides a theoretical
2Phase I-III were three separate VSI/SSB offerings made during
FY92.
basis for the selection of appropriate proxy variables to be
drawn from an administrative, pre-existing data set furnished
by Manpower Plans Division (MP), HQMC . This file, taken from
the Headquarters Master File (HMF) , contains a list of 60
socioeconomic, demographic, and military background variables.
It contains a total of 9,772 observations . ^ The population
comprises sergeant (E5) through gunnery sergeant (E7) and
includes only those individuals meeting the Marine Corps
VSI/SSB eligibility criteria for Phase I-III.
A binomial logit regression model was specified using as
the dependent variable "Take or Not Take the VSI/SSB Bonus."
Again, theory from Chapter II was used in specifying the
"quality variables." The model was used to determine the
level of significance and the level or magnitude of effect
that each quality variable and each control variable had on
the probability that a careerist Marine would take a VSI/SSB
bonus. To correct for potential selectivity bias of including
only those observations having a specific rich performance/
quality variable, the Heckman procedure was used in conjunc-
tion with the binomial logit regression model.
Equally important was the use of bivariate cross-
tabulation tables that profiled the attributes of those
Marines who took the VSI/SSB in FY92. Take rates were
obtained for different categories of Marines. The combination
30nly 9,118 observations were used for quantitative
analyses due to missing values for some variables.
of both these analytical procedures, produced readily
interpretable results and conclusions.
F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
It was discovered that quality defined by an aggregate of
several proxy variables did not distinguish Marines who took
the VSI/SSB and Marines who did not take the VSI/SSB in FY92.
Some quality variables made distinctions, others did not, and
yet others were inconsistent. If one is interested in a
certain aspect of quality, then this study offers some
conclusiveness. A total of 12 control variables were
statistically significant in the main logit regression model.
In a majority of cases, the bivariate profile supported the
model's results. It was discovered that the greater the job
tenure the lower the probability of taking VSI/SSB.
Specifically, it was determined that E5s have been targeted by
this voluntary separation-incentive policy.
A Marine's duty/job also appeared to be a significant
factor affecting VSI/SSB-choice behavior. Marines on indepen-
dent duty tended to take while Marines in school or assigned
at school commands tended not to take VSI/SSB.
Technical occupational fields, as expected, also appear to
be targeted. Technical combat service support, electronics,
and aviation-oriented military occupational specialties (MOSs)
tended to take at higher rates and were predicted to do so
based on the logit regression model.
Finally, women tend to take VSI/SSB more often than men
while blacks tended not to take at higher rates than non-
blacks. Other variables showing statistical significance
offered additional insight but had a weak magnitude of effect
on the probability of taking.
It was discovered that pre-existing and available data
sets such as the HMF yielded excellent results and are a
source of future usefulness in studying turnover behavior,
especially in this current environment of downsizing.
^ION OF THE STUDY
£aui* pter builds on the preceding chapter, i.e.,
Chapter II provides the theoretical framework for variable
creation and model specification outlined in Chapter III.
Chapter IV is confined to strictly describing the data set.
It does not describe results. Results, analyses, interpreta-
tions, and some explanations are included in Chapter V.
Included in the final chapter, Chapter VI, are not only
conclusions and recommendations, but also an identification of
research weaKnesses. Remembering each research question will
assist the reader in understanding, aid in following the flow,
and enhance the readability of this thesis. Some research
questions will be answered explicitly in Chapters V and VI
while others will be answered tacitly in Chapter III. 4
4The questions referred to are those dealing with: Which
variables best proxy quality and which best control for other
factors?
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
A. INTRODUCTION
Literature directly associated with monetary incentive
programs to induce voluntary job turnover in the Armed Forces
does not exist. After all, this is the first large scale
downsizing of the all volunteer force (AVF) . To capture
accepted research methodology and established theory, it was
necessary to investigate three areas which seemed appropriate
to the focus of this study. This literature review will
explore these three areas: organizational theory of voluntary
job turnover, U.S. military retention studies, and issues of
organizational downsizing. It is key here not to lose sight
of the focus of this thesis, which is to attempt to understand
how individual performance and guality variables interact and
affect job turnover.
An overabundance of research exists on various organiza-
tional theories of job turnover. Similarly, retention studies
are as plentiful. This literature review will attempt to
distill some of the more pertinent literature in these two
areas. Downsizing literature, however, is less plentiful and
lacks indepth quantitative analyses. Some of the literature
does, however, include limited bivariate analyses.
Performance and quality of employees/workers/military
members have seemingly been absent from the existing research.
Common problems within this area of research are definitions
and measures of performance and consequently quality. In
fact, the term quality is rarely found. The greatest amount
of research dealing with performance and turnover is found in
some of the organizational theories which will be discussed
first.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIES OF JOB TURNOVER
Here exist volumes of literature ranging from multivariate
analyses of the determinants of job turnover to the ordering
of these variables through path analysis to the mere reform-
ulation of existing models through non-empirical techniques.
The preponderance of voluntary job turnover theory deals with
variables of job satisfaction, organizational commitment,
traditional demographic characteristics, opportunity alterna-
tives, tenure, cognitive/affective orientation to job, and
perceived job security. These variables are measured many
ways and analyzed through many statistical techniques to
determine how they affect the intention to search for a job,
the intention to quit/stay, or actual quit/stay behavior.
In this section the focus will be to offer some well
established models of voluntary job turnover and discuss
follow-up studies which have expanded, tested, or explored
these models. By doing this, a better understanding of
existing theory will result and the basis for this study's
model and variable specification will be clearer.
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The four models which will be discussed are the Price
(1977) model of employee turnover [Ref. 3], the Mobley (1977)
model of employee satisfaction/dissatisfaction [Ref. 4], the
Bluedorn (1982) unified model [Ref. 5], and the Jackofsky
(1984) turnover model [Ref. 6].
1. The Price Model
The Price (1977) model is composed of antecedent
variables, a set of explanatory variables leading to a more
major explanatory variable. In this case variables of
employee pay, integration of the worker into the organization,
instrumental communication or performance-related feedback,
formal communication by the employer, and centralization of
authority will determine the level of employee satisfaction
which in turn affects employee turnover. One additional facet
to this theory is the mediating effect that the opportunity
structure has on job satisfaction's effect on turnover (Figure
1) . The opportunity structure is defined as the status of the
economy or outside economic conditions, i.e., labor market.
Price (1977) also postulated that individual demographic
characteristics (age, gender, marital status, length of
service, and education) should not have independent effects on
turnover once the other variables in the model were taken into
account. [Ref. 3]
Numerous studies have attempted to test Price's (1977)
model empirically. Price and Bluedorn (1979) used a sample of












Figure 1. The Price (1977) Model
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officers [Ref. 8], Martin (1979) used white collar
administrative - clerical - professional workers [Ref. 9],
Dickson (1977) [Ref. 10] and Price and Mueller (1979) [Ref.
11] all used more samples of nurses. All five studies
basically confirmed the model but discovered that the
mediating effect of opportunity structure on job satisfaction
didn't exist; instead, opportunity structure should have been
specified as one of the antecedent variables of turnover. The
second common discovery was that the demographic variables did
have significant effects on job turnover [Ref. 5].
Demographic data are some of the most common and
easiest types of data to obtain in research, and have proven
to continually possess powerful explanatory effect in
behavioral science. Countless studies within the social and
behavioral sciences use demographic data. Arnold and Feldman
(1982) found age as a very significant variable in determining
intention to search for job alternatives [Ref. 12 :p. 359].
Ighria and Greenhaus (1992) discovered age had significant
positive effects on job satisfaction, career satisfaction, and
organizational commitment while education had significant
negative effects on job and career satisfaction and positive,
direct effects on turnover intentions [Ref. 13:p. 43].
2 . The Mobley Model
The Mobley (1977) model, one of the most widely known,
possesses a very detailed number of linkages or mediating
steps between job satisfaction/dissatisfaction and turnover.
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Mobley (1977) postulated that job dissatisfaction would
stimulate thoughts of quitting which in turn would lead to an
evaluation of the utility to search for alternative work,
which would lead to actual search behavior, leading to
evaluation of work alternatives, leading to intention to quit,
and finally to the actual behavior of quitting (Figure 2).
[Ref. 4] What is implied in this model is conditional
causality rather than direct causality [Ref. 14:p. 509].
Mobley et al . (1978) tested his model by using 203
full time employees of a southeastern urban hospital. He
found significant regression coefficients consistent with
paths specified by his model. These results were interpreted
as support for the model's validity. [Ref. 15] Miller,
Katenberg, and Hulin (1979) discovered three limitations of
Mobley's et al. (1978) study. First, the low base rate of
turnover of 10%, restricted variance in the criterion and
affected the magnitude of relations with the predictors.
Secondly, Mobley et al. (1978) relied on his regression
coefficients to evaluate model validity. Considerable
collinearity existed among the predictors causing skewed
results. The magnitude and direction of these variables
become somewhat in question under these circumstances.
Finally, some inconsistencies occurred between the degree of
relationship between variables. One example is age and tenure
which appeared to have direct relationships with intention to
14
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Figure 2. The Mobley (1977) Model
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search and quit behavior, rather than having an indirect
relationship as specified by the model. [Ref. 14 :p. 510]
Generally speaking, Mobley's (1977) model has been
supported. Horn (1984) replicated the entire Mobley model and
found it only accounted for 15% of the variation in turnover
behavior of a sample of nurses. [Ref. 16]
3. The Bluedorn Model
The Bluedorn (1982) unified model comes from a
combination of theoretical notions from the Price (1977)
model, the Mobley (1977) model, and studies of the
relationship between organizational commitment and turnover.
In this model there are several antecedent variables
(promotion opportunities, centralization, formalization,
instrumental communication, equity, pay, routinization, and
member integration) or organizational factors which influence
an employee's job satisfaction. In addition to these
organizational factors, there are personal factors (role
conflict, length of service or tenure, age, education, and
marital status) which also influence an employee's job
satisfaction. This job satisfaction in turn affects
organizational commitment which affects intent to leave or
stay (Figure 3). Bluedorn's (1982) empirical data supported
these causal linkages. His findings suggest that organiza-










































Figure 3. The Bluedorn (1982) Unified Model
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Other studies dealing with determinants of job
turnover have found strong direct linkages among several
variables and job turnover. Arnold and Feldman (1982)
discovered actual turnover behavior was significantly and
directly affected by age, tenure, overall job satisfaction,
organizational commitment, perceived job security, and
intention to search for alternative jobs [Ref. 12:p. 359].
These differences in paths, antecedent variables, and linkages
appear to be a function of research techniques, statistical
modeling, measurement techniques, and data collection.
4. The Jackofsky Model
The Jackofsky (1984) turnover model is of special
interest in this thesis because of the nature of its theory.
This model focuses on employee performance. Jackofsky (1984)
proposed that job performance impacts on both the desirability
of movement out of an organization and the ease of movement
out of an organization. Desirability of movement out of an
organization can also be defined as job satisfaction. [Ref.
6] The effect performance has on this job satisfaction is
contingent upon job-related stimuli (performance-related
rewards, task structure, and leader behavior) and individual
differences (self-esteem and ability) . In other words if
employees receive strong rewards for high levels of
performance, then high-performing employees will be more
satisfied with their job and less likely to leave (Figure 4)
.
It is unclear what the effect of individual differences have
18
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Figure 4. The Jackofsky (1984) Model
19
on the relationship between performance and desirability of
movement . [ Re f . 6
]
The manner in which performance is hypothesized co
influence ease of movement is demonstrated by high performers
who perceive, within the context of current labor conditions
and tenure levels, greater ease of movement inside and out of
the organization in terms of expectation of finding alter-
native employment inside or out of the organization. [Ref.
17:p, 310]
^ackofsky (1984) model has yet to be empirically
tested altnough some studies have touched on job performance
as a variable linked either directly or indirectly to job
turnover. Meyer, Paunonen, Gellatly, Goffin, and Jackson
(1989) linked job performance to two different types of
organizational commitment through regression analysis. They
found job performance and affective commitment (strength of an
individual's identification with and involvement in a
particular organization) had a positive relationship while
performance =*nd continuance commitment (tendency to engage in
con _ines of activity because of cost of doing
otherwise) had a negative relationship. They did not test the
relationship between performance and job satisfaction as
discussed in Jackofsky's (1984) model. [Ref. 18:p. 155]
Shore and Martin (1989) found, through a series of
regression analyses, that job performance and job satisfac-
tion were more closely and positively related, than job
20
satisfaction and organizational commitment. They found
specific job attitudes were more closely connected to outcomes
such as performance ratings while more global organizational
attitudes were more closely tied to outcomes such as intent to
leave an organization. [Ref. 19:p. 625] This supports
Mowday's (1979) contention that job satisfaction is more
transitory and changeable an attitude than organizational
commitment [Ref. 20].
Once again we find conflicting research. A careful
review of both of the above studies reveal vastly different
measures of performance, job satisfaction, and organizational
commitment. Meyer, Paunonen, Gellatly, Goffin, and Jackson
(1989) used survey data taken from samples of Canadian food
service employees [Ref. 18 :p. 153] while Shore and Martin
(1989) used totally different survey data taken from samples
of hospital and bank employees from the midwestern U.S. [Ref.
19:pp. 628-629] Nevertheless, the Jackofsky (1984) theory
appears to have some relevance to future studies which deal
with quality/performance measures linked to job turnover.
5. Related Research
These four models embody much of the basic theory
behind voluntary job turnover within the field of organiza-
tional psychology. Numerous other models and theory exist but
each tend to have roots derived from the four models above.
Arnold and Feldman (1982) proposed that age, job satisfaction,
and organizational commitment directly affect intention to
21
search for alternative employment which in turn affects
turnover behavior. Both tenure and perceived job security
directly affect turnover behavior. [Ref. 12] Again we have
a new twist on a similar theme. Human behavior has displayed
its illusiveness . The many attributes of human behavior
possess delicate interaction highly sensitive to each other.
Their measure is difficult to capture, as evidenced by the
volumes of contradictory research in voluntary turnover
behavior. It must be noted the preponderance of the research
in this area comes from survey data not archival data as used
in this study. Only the use of proxy variables, representing
many of the variables already discussed, will be available for
this study.
C. U.S. MILITARY RETENTION STUDIES
Military retention is as common a topic in the military as
turnover behavior is in psychology. When looking for back-
ground information and prior research that would closely
parallel job exit incentive programs, retention incentive
programs seem a logical choice. In essence, exit incentives
are selective reenlistment bonus (SRB) incentives in reverse.
Care must be taken when interpreting studies analyzing SRBs
and comparing them to VSI/SSB programs. Most retention and
SRB studies deal with first-term reenlistment. VSI/SSB
programs deal with careerists who have much different tastes,
preferences, and demographic characteristics than first
termers. The additional value that the review of retention
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studies offers to this thesis is the contribution of modeling
techniques and variable specification.
In this section the focus will be upon literature which
deal with quality and performance measures and the effects
different variables have had on retention as supported by
empirical study.
1. Quality/Performance Variables and Measures
As discovered in reviewing organizational theory on
job turnover, the concept of quality work force and perform-
ance was rarely addressed. Performance in organizational
theory was discussed in terms of having supervisors conduct
special performance appraisals on workers. This was
accomplished in conjunction with those same workers who were
returning questionnaires to researchers, Shore and Martin
(1989) [Ref. 19] and Meyer, Paunonen, Gellatly, Goffin, and
Jackson (1989) [Ref. 18]. Many retention studies have defined
quality as an individual service member who has a high Armed
Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) score (mental group category)
and a higher level of education, as in the Marcus (1984) [Ref.
21] and Ward and Tan (1985) [Ref. 22] studies. The Ward and
Tan (1985) study did however, develop a quality index of first
termers using AFQT, education level, and promotion times.
They experienced a lack of good performance data. Their
source of data was the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC)
which holds no actual performance data per se. Working under
this constraint, Ward and Tan (1985) found that high-quality
23
people in technical specialties reenlisted at a lower rate,
except in the Marine Corps where the reenlistment rate was
about the same. Overall they found the services were
retaining more high-quality people than were leaving. This
situation existed despite their evidence that when performance
was controlled for, those people with high AFQT scores and
higher education levels possessed a higher probability of
leaving. [Ref. 22]
Marcus (1984) also used first termers and assessed the
effect quality variables (education and mental group) had on
retention. He found that the high quality people were much
more susceptible to reenlistment bonuses and pay increases
than lower quality people. He used a logit regression model
to assess the effects certain variables had on the probability
a service member would reenlist or not. Marcus also found as
military pay lagged behind civilian pay the quality people
tended to leave at a higher proportion. As was discovered in
job turnover theory, Marcus (1984) linked advancement or
promotion opportunities to retention. [Ref. 21]
2. Effects of Various Variables on Retention
Cavin (1988) conducted a study to determine the number
of dimensions in which satisfaction with military life should
be measured. Based upon a Marine Corps sample of the 1985 DOD
Member Survey and using factor analysis, he discovered that an
overall satisfaction variable did not exist. Instead, three
factors emerged: personal fulfillment, military family
24
stability, and military fringe benefits. Each of these
factors had an extensive composition of satisfaction
variables. Cavin (1988) concluded that economic factors
explain only a small part of the retention picture and felt
the behavior he attempted to quantify, such as family
stability, share a major piece of the retention equation.
[Ref. 23]
Fletcher and Giesler (1981) conducted another study
based on job satisfaction variables which combined a trinomial
logit regression model with factor analysis. Here they used
Navy Occupational Task Analysis Program (NOTAP) survey data
and specified a trinomial dependent variable (leave, extend,
or reenlist) as functions of demographic variables, military
job, military life, and pay factors with service controls.
They looked at careerists and found the following
relationships: 1) The greater the service member's ability to
choose their duty station the greater the tendency to
reenlist. 2) Pay dissatisfaction tended to lower reenlist-
ment. 3) The more dependents the greater the tendency to
reenlist. 4) Non-white service members had a greater tendency
to reenlist than white service members. Fletcher and Giesler
(1981) concluded that quality-of-life issues impact on a
careerist's decision to reenlist more than a first termer's
decision. [Ref. 24]
Using somewhat of a different approach, Jacobson and
Thomason (1983) took survey data from the March 1976 Current
25
Population Survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau and data
from the Summary Earnings Records from the Social Security
Administration to determine the effect on permanent change of
station (PCS) moves on military wives' earnings and husbands'
retention. Using regression analysis and a series of
earnings, demographic, and relocation variables, they had
difficulty in determining, directly, the effect of wives'
earnings losses due to PCS moves on husbands' retention. Data
inadequacy caused the problem. Regardless, the authors could
conclude labor participation rates for military wives in 1975
were 8%-20% lower than civilian wives and that PCS moves
lowered the collective income of many military families.
[Ref. 25] They postulated, based upon Goldberg and Warner's
(1982) estimate [Ref. 26] that a one percent decrease in
military compensation in the form of reduced bonuses, would
reduce first term enlistments by about two percent, that
retention would be negatively affected by reduction of overall
family income. This fact, coupled with relocation of children
into new schools and incomplete compensation of PCS costs to
families, creates a potentially formidable variable. [Ref.
25]
Cymrot (1987) attempted to establish a quantitative
variable which would capture these various explicit and
implicit costs of leaving the service. The Annualized Cost of
Leaving (ACOL) approach creates a quantitative variable
representing an individual's tastes and preferences which
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Cymrot (1987) included into a logit regression equation having
a binomial dependent variable, reenlist or leave. The ACOL
approach is a purely econometric approach to much of the
behavior already discussed in organizational theory of
turnover. Here Cymrot (1987) uses his model to determine the
effect of SRBs on retention. This effect could then be used
in assigning multiples for the SRB program by occupational
specialty. Cymrot (1987) did discover that as the service
offers greater bonuses, the probability of an individual
reenlisting does go up, unlike results obtained from purely a
bivariate approach. [Ref. 27]
Retention studies have offered a number of multi-
variate, bivariate, and econometric methodologies for studying
the effects of demographic, behavioral, and economic variables
on military retention. The total mystery of why an individual
reenlists has now been reduced to merely a mystery. At least
through studies such as these a better idea of the type of
variables and statistical methodologies used by current
researchers can be obtained. This knowledge is useful when
trying to construct and specify variables within a model using
archival data rather than survey data. Even though quality
variables were discussed somewhat, little has been done on
measuring the quality of our careerist force and the impact
this has on retention or turnover behavior.
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D. ORGANIZATIONAL DOWNSIZING
A review of literature would seem incomplete if a brief
discussion of downsizing issues were deleted from a thesis
focused on a particular problem/ issue generated under
downsizing conditions. What is found when seeking this type
of literature is a myriad of non-empirical articles focusing
primarily upon the types of strategies available to downsizing
organizations and the effect those strategies have on the
organization in terms of efficiency, productivity, and
employee morale. The few empirical studies which exist are
strictly bivariate using several cross-tabulation tables and
descriptive statistics. It is guite difficult to find any
current downsizing literature that empirically studies the
measured effects of downsizing strategies on higher performers
or the guality work force within an organization.
Nevertheless, two topics exist within downsizing
literature which are germane to this thesis. This section
will first review literature on voluntary early retirement.
Then it will explore material which conveys general concerns
about the environment created by downsizing and how that
environment may influence job turnover behavior.
1. Early Retirement
Strategies of downsizing discussed most in literature
are voluntary early retirement incentive programs. Even
though VSI/SSB is not a retirement program, it nevertheless
shares some similarities, such as the cash or monetary
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incentive to leave an organization earlier than planned. In
the corporate world, the VSI/SSB program would equate to "buy-
outs." [Ref. 28:pp. 195-196] Very little has been written
about buy-outs simply because they are not the strategy of
choice in the private sector [Ref. 29:pp. 35-36]. Quality
people are not targeted for downsizing because corporations
choose selected layoffs and performance based reductions in
force (RIFs) first. Early retirement programs seem to "clean
up" the balance of reduction goals. What effects do early
retirement programs and buy-outs have on the attitudes of
workers? A survey of middle managers from 600 companies in
the U.S. conducted by Lou Harris and Associates found that 65%
of managers thought less loyalty was displayed by their
salaried workers than existed 10 years ago [Ref. 30:p. 29].
Kuzmits and Sussman (1988) concluded that this is a result of
the new corporate environment where bottom-line results
overrule job security [Ref. 30:p. 29]. In the same survey by
Lou Harris and Associates, 44% of these middle managers felt
sure they would be allowed to stay with the company as long as
they did well. Another 44% said they may not be able to stay
while the final 12% was not sure. [Ref. 30:p. 29] With this
kind of environment of uncertainty, worker behavior may take
on new dimensions with regard to voluntary job turnover.
These new dimensions have yet to be studied.
Early retirements are a popular downsizing strategy
with 11% of all U.S. firms offering incentives for early
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retirement. It may have an undesirable, rapid reduction
effect if not controlled. Dupont accomplished a three year
12,000-15,000 person reduction goal in sightly over a year.
[Ref. 30:p. 29]
Kuzmits and Sussman (1988) point out that old
corporate goals have been to retain quality people and foster
a sense of mutual loyalty between employer and employee.
Today however, the contemporary corporate goals stress success
through attracting, developing, and retaining a competent,
motivated work force. These two goals are fundamentally
different. They also point out that downsizing strategies can
inadvertently cut skilled or quality people. Dupont offered
early retirement in an attempt to cut 6,500 workers and
experienced double that figure in the numbers who volunteered
for the program. Dupont was later forced to hire back some of
these employees as consultants because it lost too many
quality and vital people. [Ref. 28:p. 196] A similar program
was offered at Manville Corporation and among the takers was
the company president [Ref. 28:p. 196]. Seibert and Seibert
(1989) have suggested that for these types of "pull" down-
sizing strategies, several restrictive offerings or windows
should be developed [Ref. 31:pp. 80-81]. The Marine Corps
VSI/SSB phased-of ferings are good examples of three small and
somewhat different windows.
One important lesson both Dupont and Manville learned
was that quality people can get lumped into large sweeping
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offerings of early retirement or early out incentive programs
[Ref. 28]. Kuzmits and Sussman (1989) estimate that: between
10%-20% of a corporation's high quality work force can be lost
through voluntary early retirement and buy-out programs [Ref.
30:p. 31] .
Early retirement/buy-out incentives must appear
equitable within an organization. Employers should prevent
employees from feeling that they were treated unfairly or
received lower compensation. If the strategy is to accomplish
the organizational reductions and if the organization wishes
to lower downsizing anxiety among the workers, then this point
best be taken to heart. [Ref. 32]
2. General Concerns About the Downsizing Environment
Conditions of downsizing normally occur during periods
of economic depression and recession [Ref. 28]. Much of what
has already been reviewed under organizational theory was
accomplished under various conditions of the economy. Some
studies, Price (1977) [Ref. 3], Bluedorn (1982) [Ref. 5], and
Jackofsky (1984) [Ref. 6] included outside economic conditions
within their variable set. In almost all cases these
conditions had some type of significant effect on turnover.
Cyclic economic downturns resulting in temporary work force
reductions, historically in some industrial sectors, have been
common (Feldman 1988) [Ref. 33]. Sutton (1987) [Ref. 34] and
Whetten (1980) [Ref. 35] have recognized that downsizing may
be a normative process, in that firms are created, they grow,
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then decline, and possibly die. In an attempt to compare this
type of environment to the military, one comes up short.
Death of DOD will certainly not occur, at least from a
practical perspective. Even though the downsizing environment
ra, ".ot be a unigue phenomenon in the private sector, one can
"" is very unigue within a military system of all
volunt.c=. ;. Threats of RIFs, more selective reenlistment
criteria, increased promotion scrutiny, abolishment of service
limits due to an "up or out" enlisted promotion policy,
already exist within the Marine Corps today. The downsizing
environment is alive and well in the U.S. military
establishment.
Of egual concern with those who accept VSI/SSB or
other exit incentive programs are the survivors of the
downsizing phenomenon. Do employees retain the corporate
mission and workload (operation tempo) with less help, due to
reductions, or do operations scale down? What sense of job
security ev^sts now? Will I be allowed to stay as long as I
perform well? These are typical guestions being asked.
Cameron, Freeman, and Mishra (1991) reported on results of a
four year longitudinal study of organizational downsizing and
redesign in 30 organizations in the U.S. automobile industry.
Most of these were suppliers to manufacturers in the industry.
They discovered downsizing tended to deteriorate organiza-
tional levels of guality and productivity. [Ref . 36] Ashford
(1988) found that during AT&T's downsizing and restructuring
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that employees who survived the action experienced stress
caused by job uncertainty. Survivors must adapt to the post-
reduction organization [Ref. 37]. Bridges (1986) studied the
transition employees go through in this type of a situation.
He saw workers go through a three part psychological process:
1) Disengagement, disidentif ication, and disenchantment, a
letting go of the old role. 2) A neutral sense of disorienta-
tion, disintegration, and discovery. 3) Acceptance of the new
job or role and any new purposes of the organization. [Ref.
38] Managers must assist survivors in their adjustment to the
new work environment or even survivors of downsizing may be
applying for early out incentives or become organizational
attrition [Ref. 29]
.
Downsizing issues do assist in trying to understand
the relationship between incentive strategies and how those
strategies affect organizations in general and individuals in
particular. These issues paint environmental pictures of the
situations and conditions which exist and how individual
behavior toward voluntary job turnover may be affected.
Understanding the concepts of downsizing provides the context
of this study.
E. CONCLUSION
After having reviewed organizational theory of job turn-
over, studies on U.S. military retention, and downsizing
issues, it remains clear that research on specific issues in
this area of study is both illusive and complex. The
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interactions of variables, measurements, definitions, sample
data, and conditions of the environment are very active and
sensitive.
The literature and research is massive on job turnover and
military retention; yet nothing has been done on the effects
individual attributes and quality variables have on acceptance
or rejection of voluntary incentive exit programs. One can
surmise from the literature that even though much of the
research was conducted over varying economic conditions, the
quit behavior measured may in fact be drastically different
from quit behavior of Marine enlisted service members found in
the current, unique environment of downsizing. The additional
unknown here is how this decision to stay or leave is made
within the context of a monetary incentive exit program. Does
the concept of SRBs have a similar effect in the case of exit





Many of the concepts of prior research together with a
unique data set, unstudied by other researchers, led to the
development of a methodology that incorporates both bivariate
and multivariate analyses of an extensive array of archival
variables. These variables proxy many of the variables
described in the survey data mentioned in the previous
chapter: job satisfaction, tenure, advancement or career
opportunity, pay incentives, job search, demography, and
quality.
The purpose of this study is to determine whether the
Marine Corps is losing an inordinately high proportion of
quality, careerist, enlisted Marines to the VSI/SSB separation
incentive program. Another facet which is critical to the
study is to profile the attributes which affect the
probability that a careerist Marine takes the separation
incentive program. With this goal in mind, it must also be
remembered, as in much of the research done in organizational
theory of job turnover and military retention, many variables
have tremendous effect on each other, and these relationships
ultimately affect job turnover, the dependent variable. One
must assume this indirect-effect phenomenon will likely occur
in this study. Even though a bivariate analysis would be the
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easiest to understand, by itself it may not explain this
interdependence or this effect individual variables have on
one another. It may also not explain how that interdependency
affects the dependent variable in this study, whether a Marine
will take or not take the VSI/SSB separation bonus.
Statistical, econometrical , multivariate analysis applied to
survey data does not explain total causality, but it does
provide statistical inferential evidence; therefore it will be
useful to include both multivariate and bivariate analyses
unis thesis [Ref. 39:pp. 74-75].
In order to determine whether too many quality Marines are
leaving due to the VSI/SSB program, a definition of quality
must be developed in terms of variables available for measure
and study. These quality variables will be the focus
variables for this study. Bivariate profiling of these
variables against takers/non-takers of VSI/SSB should help
indicate the proportion of Marines with quality attributes who
took the program and separated. The statistical significance
of that information is unknown without additional multivariate
analysis. An econometric model containing these quality
(focus) variables and several control variables can be used to
determine their level of effect upon the dependent variable,
the probability a Marine will take the VSI/SSB program. From
this model one can obtain inferential evidence necessary to
balance and frame the information yielded by the bivariate
profile. This thesis will employ cross- tabulation tables and
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binomial logistic regression performed through the SAS Version
6 mainframe computer package. Together, these two analyses
may offer the insight necessary to answer this study's
research questions.
The binomial logit procedure appears to best model
relationships which possess a binary type of dependent
variable. In this case, the dependent variable is the choice
an individual Marine makes, to take or not take the VSI/SSB,
coded either as a one or as a zero dummy variable. Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis has some serious
defects when trying to model this kind of binary, dependent
variable [Ref. 40:p. 216]. It is not within the scope of this
thesis to consider the pros and cons of the various types of
regression analysis techniques.
Specification of the multivariate model is crucial to the
successful interpretation of its results. Theory surrounding
the selection of variables is steeped in the theory mentioned
in the previous chapter. Variable selection is also dependent
upon the available data set, in this case, a data set
furnished by Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC) , Manpower
Plans division, MPP-21, Washington D.C. This data set, an
extract from the Headquarters Master File (HMF) is relatively
easy to obtain and access by Marine Corps manpower planners.
It is the data typically used for manpower policy decisions.
The HMF is based on historical administrative information and
is limited to its several hundred pre-established information
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fields or variables. To better specify the model, the
relationships, and the proxies, additional variables must be
created through interactive combination or rescaling. The
next section will explain variable creation and variable




The manner in which these variables will be categorized
will be dependent upon whether they are focus variables
(quality) or control variables. All control variables will be
further classified by the characteristics they may proxy,
based on the theory from Chapter II.
1. Focus Variables
All these variables will fall into the category of
quality proxies. Each variable looks at a different attribute
within a larger definition of quality. Naturally, not all
desired quality attributes can be derived from an archival
data set, and this data set is no exception. An attempt was
mad_, uowever, to capture as many quality variables as
realistically possible. A specific definition of quality is
neither realistic nor necessary; rather, quality can be
defined in terms of variables that can be measured or




The quality of a careerist Marine is somewhat
difficult to measure, but even in retention and organizational
theory studies, an individual's performance, as evaluated by
a supervisor, was used as a routine measure. Using this
similar notion, the variable PI or performance index is a
measure of this kind of performance. It ranges on a scale
from 3.5, being the lowest performance mark, to 9.0, being the
highest performance mark. Very little deviation (standard
deviation .52) is measured due to the inflation of the
performance evaluation system within the Marine Corps. Pis
are derived from Marines' fitness reports received in their
current grade. The marks given to a Marine in Section B
blocks 13a-15a (See Appendix A) are averaged by report. These
averages are in turn averaged over the total number of reports
that a Marine has received in his/her current grade taken back
no more than five years. This is the score assigned to that
Marine. Whether the Marine performed within his/her military
occupational specialty (MOS) or not does not affect the
performance index. This then, provides a good overall job
performance measure.
One problem exists within the automated system
containing Pis. Pis for individuals will drop out of the
system's data file if a Marine is recently promoted and has
not received at least one fitness report in that new grade.
An individual's PI will also drop out of the system if that
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individual is discharged anytime during the period the HMF
covers, or in other words before the closing date for that
period of HMF data. The HMF is quarterly data which was
merged with the PI data taken from an unrelated data file held
by Manpower Management division, HQMC. The specifics of the
problem will be discussed in the next chapter. The immediate
problem with the variable is that half of the original sample
fails to possess Pis. By using this very crucial variable,
half of the original sample size must be deleted.
Jackofsky (1984) theorized job performance would
affect a worker's perception of ease of movement and
desirability of movement [Ref. 6]. Since Jackofsky or other
researchers have never empirically tested this theory, results
of this thesis could offer support/non-support for her
contention.
b. GTGCTTOT
Many first term retention studies have measured
quality in terms of Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT)
scores. AFQT scores, in many studies, have not been found to
carry statistical significance in the second or succeeding
reenlistments of military service members. Nevertheless, its
relationship to other quality variables is not altogether
clear. It is for this reason a measure of entry level
intelligence be used in this thesis. Available in this data
set was the GCT composite score. AFQT score data appeared
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flawed and missing for a vast majority of the sample's
observations
.
The GCT score's correlation to AFQT scoring would
appear to be the highest of any other composite score
calculated from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
(ASVAB) . The GCT score is made up of three of the four sub-
scores which make up the AFQT score. Both of these composite
scores are derived from word knowledge (WK)
,
paragraph
comprehension (PC) , and arithmetic reasoning (AR) . GCT
includes mechanical comprehension (MC) while AFQT includes
math knowledge (MK)
.
5 The name of the GCT variable in this
study is GTGCTTOT.
C. COLL
Education level, in many studies, has usually been
a demographic variable and in terms of high school education,
will remain as a demographic control variable in this study.
The education quality variable, for this thesis, will measure
whether a Marine has completed any college. Just as officer
retention studies have used graduate education as a quality
measure (Bowman 1990) , this study will use any college
attendance as a quality measure of enlisted, careerist Marines
[Ref. 41]. The dummy variable, COLL indicates whether a
Marine has ever completed one or more years of college.
telephone interview with Captain D.W. Hentsti USMC, Marine




Within the Marine Corps exist two types of duty
which entail an extensive screening and schooling process for
enlisted, careerist Marines. Recruiting and drill instructor
duty are both demanding and time intensive jobs. The Marine
Corps selects guality performers from virtually every location
and "walk of life" to round out these positions. It then
screens these Marines for intelligence, moral turpitude, past
performance, commitment to duty, and financial stability.
Both prospective recruiters and drill instructors attend
schools designed not only to impart requisite skills but to
screen out potential duty failures. HQMC will assign those
Marines who complete successful tours on either of these
duties an additional MOS designating them as former recruiters
(8411) or drill instructors (8511) . The dummy variable
created for this model is F_RCTRDI , which detects whether an
individual has or does not have an additional MOS of
8411/8511.
e . N_ADDMOS
In somewhat a similar manner, additional MOSs are
assigned to Marines. Marines achieve these additional MOSs by
performing them on-the-job. Each Marine must demonstrate
proficiency and consistent performance, with or possibly
without formal training in that MOS. Graduation from a formal
MOS training school could also qualify an individual for an
additional MOS. Most commands will give only good performers
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and those with demonstrated potential, possessing a genuine
desire to learn, the opportunities which will culminate in an
additional MOS assignment. As such, a dummy variable was
created (N_ADDMOS) detecting any Marine who does not have at
least one additional MOS.
f . NODUTY
Even though the data set being used shows very few
observations of Marines in a non-full duty status, it still
seemed logical to include a dummy variable that would capture
whether a Marine fit into this category. Granted, this
variable does not necessarily model any variability in
performance, but it does pull out individuals that will most
likely not be quality performers. Non-full duty status
includes those pending medical separation/disposition, courts
martials, administrative separation or anyone pending some
other less than positive separation or disposition. The
NODUTY dummy variable captures this attribute.
g. PFTSCORE
The final focus variable proxying quality
attributes is PFTSCORE. This quantitative variable represents
the last physical fitness test (PFT) score assigned to an
individual Marine as of the date the data set was created.
One would expect good all-around performers to have a higher
than average PFT score, since the Marine Corps stresses both
mental and physical toughness and discipline. Raw PFT scores
43
seem a better measure, of physical achievement than PFT class
which are age determined PFT score categories.
Table 1 summarizes the focus (quality) variables.
TABLE 1













These variables will be classified in groups based
upon the characteristics they appear to proxy. The first
category will be those variables which seem to proxy job
satisfaction. One element of job satisfaction in military
service is the amount of deployment time one is required to
serve. Great amounts of accumulated deployment time mean long
periods away from immediate family or relatives. It means
holidays are work days and on many deployments it means seven
day work weeks and 12-16 hour work days. Deployment periods
are normally very demanding and on many occasions "in harms
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way." Marines can achieve allot of job satisfaction through
successful deployments. The author theorizes however, there
exists a point of diminishing returns due to family separation
and separation from one's own country, culture, and life
style. The variable used here is DEPLTIME and is a
guantitative variable scaled in the number of months of
accumulated deployed time an individual Marine possesses as of
the closing date of the guarterly data file.
b. DAUS_DR1
Another variable that is similar, in that it deals
with overseas duty and the time frame an individual has been
back in the continental United States (CONUS) from an
unaccompanied overseas tour is DAUS_DR1. It represents the
number of years an individual has been back in CONUS from
their last overseas, unaccompanied tour to 5 December 1991,
the initial date the data was created. In other words, anyone
in the zero years category has just returned from an
unaccompanied or dependents restricted overseas tour within
the last year prior to 5 December 1991. If an individual has
a very mature DAUS_DR1 value, he/she may be anticipating
orders to an overseas tour. This tour may not be a desirable
assignment at this particular point in his/her career. On the
other hand, if he/she just had completed an overseas
unaccompanied tour which was very successful, he/she may have
experienced tremendous job satisfaction. Either way, the
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variable may have a significant effect on the decision to stay
or take the separation bonus (VSI/SSB) and leave.
C. DCTB_YRS
Homesteading is an issue coming to the forefront
of manpower management concerns. The Marine Corps hierarchy
has discouraged homesteading for many years for a myriad of
reasons, yet homesteading appeals to the individual Marine
from a number of standpoints. Financially, homesteading is
very lucrative for a Marine and his/her family. The Marine
can eliminate relocation costs, have an opportunity to invest
in a home, and the dependent spouse can maintain solvent
employment. A variable which captures the individual's time
at a current duty assignment is DCTB_YRS . This variable
indicates the number of years a Marine has been in their
current tour of duty, in the same location. It will be
assumed that the longer one has been at the same location, the
more satisfying to the Marine.
d. GEOBACH
A variable linked to a Marine's family situation
is one that would capture the notion of geographic bachelor-
hood. Since this condition will be assumed to be an
undesirable condition for most Marines, the idea of job
satisfaction again enters the equation. One problem with this
specific variable is how it was developed using archival data.
The HMF identifies dependents' locations only by state as are
the active duty members' duty station locations. The active
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duty members' residence locations are not directly available
in this data set. Manual data manipulation was required for
those observations of active duty Marines stationed in
locations which were within a reasonable commuting distance
(1-1.5 hours commute time) from their dependent's location.
One such example is the Marine working in Washington D.C. and
the dependents residing in Virginia or Maryland. Another
example is the Marine working in Kansas City, Kansas and the
dependents living in Missouri. These types of situations and
more, were considered and manually adjusted.
Some geographic bachelors would fail to be
detected by using the programming technique mentioned in this
thesis. An example, those Marines who work in a large state
such as California and have dependents located elsewhere in
that same state, too far for commuting, i.e., Marine working
in 29 Palms CA with dependents living near Camp Pendleton, CA.
Nevertheless, the GEOBACH dummy variable will pick up a
majority of the geographic bachelors within the sample.
e. N_INMOS
The type of duty or job a Marine is assigned
should have an effect on job satisfaction, especially if the
job is outside the Marine's primary MOS or skill area. Two
variables were created to pick up these effects. N_INMOS
detects whether the Marine is currently serving a tour of duty
outside of his/her primary MOS. The type of duty assignment
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they currently are serving in is indicated by the duty
variables listed below.
f. Duty Variables
All the below listed duty assignments were derived
from Marine Corps major command codes (MCCs) . FMF_DU are
Marines currently serving in Fleet Marine Force (FMF) units.
NFMF_DU are Marines serving at Marine Corps bases or major
Marine Corps support establishments supporting or hosting FMF
units. SECUR_DU encompasses Marines on security duty such as
Marine Security Guards (MSGs) duty at U.S. embassies abroad,
Marine Corps Security Forces (MCSF) , Marine detachments
afloat, and Naval Security Groups. RCTG_DU includes those
Marines assigned to Marine Corps recruiting stations,
districts, and officer selection stations. SCH_DU includes
those Marines either assigned as a student or as a permanent
member of a school command. Separation between the two could
not be accomplished using the current data set. The last
category (INDEP_DU) encompassed everyone else who was assigned
duty independent of major Marine Corps commands or establish-
ments. These include Marines on inspector/ instructor duty at
Marine reserve centers, those assigned to aviation detach-
ments, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) units, Marine
liaison and support offices, military advisor groups, area
auditor groups, and Department of the Navy/Defense independent
billets. Each of these variables are dummy variables. Table
2 summarizes all job satisfaction variables.
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Another category of control variable is the tenure
proxy. YOS or years of service and AGE are the only two
variables created to pick-up how long a Marine has been in the
Corps. The time in grade variable (TIG) is used primarily to
proxy an individual's perception of promotion and advancement
opportunities rather than tenure. A greater discussion of the
effect each of these variables have on one another in a
multivariate model, will be accomplished in the next chapter.
h. NREBONUS/ADD_PAY
Pecuniary incentives or pay opportunities comprise
yet another category to be considered. Here such dummy
variables as NREBONUS will be used. This variable reflects
whether a Marine has never received a reenlistment bonus.
The ADD_PAY variable indicates if a Marine is currently
receiving either special pay or proficiency pay. Both of
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these payments are additional pay that Marines receive for
either special duty, hazardous duty, or extraordinarily
demanding duty. This quantitative variable is represented by
increments of $25, to better measure the effect the variable
may have on the model's dependent variable, take or not take
the VSI/SSB. A value of two equals $50 additional pay while
a value of 8.8 equals $220 of additional pay.
i. ADSPOUS
Whether a Marine has an active-duty spouse greatly
affects the family income. As this has a significant effect
on pay opportunities, it may also have an effect on job
satisfaction, in that the Marine Corps normally requires both
spouses to work full time, be available for worldwide
assignment, and potentially be stationed apart. Regardless,
the ADSPOUS dummy variable will be classified under pecuniary
opportunities. Tables 3 and 4 summarize tenure, advancement
opportunity, and pecuniary incentive variable proxies.
TABLE 3
LISTING OF CONTROL VARIABLES
















Both Mobley (1977) and Bluedorn (1982) have
proposed that job search leads to intentions to quit or stay
in a particular job situation. It is important then to
attempt to proxy this relationship. Three variables were
created CONT_EXP or contract expired, TT_EAS or time to end of
active service (EAS) , and TT_EASSQ which is TT_EAS squared.
The rationale for TT_EASSQ is that the author hypothesizes
that if the time to EAS was close (low value) then the
probability to job search and leave would possibly be high,
but as the time to EAS became greater, the probability to job
search and possibly leave would reach a pinnacle then begin to
decline as in a quadratic function. TT_EAS is scaled in
months.
CONT_EXP is a dummy variable. It will be used in
the Heckman model, which will be explained further in the
Model Specification section of this chapter. The dependent
variable of the Heckman model will be the choice between a
Marine having or not having a PI. Remember that an observa-
tion would not have a PI associated to it if that individual
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had been discharged during the period included in the cross
sectional data set, from 1 December 1991 to 31 May 1992.
CONT_EXP identifies those people who had an EAS during that
period. Their contract expires, per se.
k. Race/Education/Marital/Gender/Citizenship
The final categories of control variables will
include demographic, grade, and occupation, variables. All of
these have had tremendous effects on many multivariate studies
mentioned in Chapter II.
Demographic variables included in this model are,
race (CAUC, BLCK, OTHR) , education (HSG, NHSG) , whether a
Marine is a non-native born U.S. citizen (NBORNCIT) , marital
status (MARRIED, DIVORC, SINGL) , and gender (FEMALE). Each of
these are dummy variables. The only quantitative demographic
variable is NUMDEP, or the number of dependents a Marine
possesses.
1. E5/E6/E7
Grade variables are broken down by pay-grades, E5,
E6, and E7 . These dummy variables include only those grades
that were eligible for the VSI/SSB separation incentive
program. E4s were not used, even though they were eligible,
since they do not receive fitness reports, and consequently
are not assigned Pis.
m. Occupational Fields
Occupational field (occ field) variables had to be
aggregated into logical groupings since the Marine Corps has
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36 enlisted occupational fields. For purposes of this thesis,
six groupings were created. Table 5 lists the occupational





Supply Administration and Operations
Food Service *
CMBTARMS Infantry
Tank and Assault Amphibious Vehicle
Artillery
CSS_NT Intel 1 igence
Logistics
Engineer, Construction, and Equipment
Ordnance







Signals Intelligence/Ground Electronic Warfare
Data Systems *
Aircraft Maintenance
Air Control/Air Support/Anti -air Warfare
Air Traffic Control and Enlisted Flight Crews *
GARSUP Printing and Reproduction
Traffic Management
Auditing, Finance, and Accounting *
Marine Corps Exchange *
Public Affairs
Training and Visual Information Support
Music
Military Police and Corrections
Weather Service *
Airfield Services






* Not represented in the sample
Source: Author
Tables 6-9 summarize the job search, demographic,
grade, and occupational field variable proxies.
TABLE 6





































The statistical procedures of choice, as previously
mentioned, will be the use of bivariate cross-tabulation
tables and binomial logit regression analysis.
1. The Heckman Procedural Model
Since only one-half of the total sample have Pis and
the goal is to use PI as a the crucial quality (focus)
variable, only those observations having Pis must be selected
out of the original sample and used. The problem this may
cause is selectivity bias. By selecting out a sub-sample
based on those observations having Pis, as opposed to using a
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sample drawn from acceptable, statistical, random sampling,
selectivity bias may have been introduced into the model. To
compensate for this potential bias, it is necessary to use a
procedure which will detect and "control for" any selectivity
bias introduced. The Heckman procedure will be used in this
study to accomplish just that feat. [Ref. 42]
By specifying a logit regression model composed of
independent variables which would potentially influence and
affect the dependent variable, in this case, the probability
a Marine in the original sample has a PI , a predicted value
can be created (BIASSAS) for the entire sample. By taking
this predicted value/new variable, which is the calculated





a final independent variable (BIAS) is created. It is this
new variable which will then be placed in the main model using
the sample of only those observations having a PI. Once the
main logit model has been run, statistical significance of the
BIAS variable can be determined. If the variable proves
statistically significant, then selectivity bias probably
exists, and the presence of the BIAS variable together with
its parameter estimate in the model, controls for it. If, on
the other hand, the variable is statistically insignificant,
then selectivity bias most likely does not exist. [Ref 42]
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Since the absence of a PI indicates recent promotion
or discharge, variables were specified which would best model
those two occurrences. Table 10 contains the Heckman model




Variable Effect on Promotion Effect on Discharge Overal
I
NODUTY - + -
NHSG - -
COLL + + +
F RCTRDI + . +
PFTSCORE + + T
N AD0MOS . -
DEPLTIME + + -r
DCTB YRS . -
DAUS DR1 + -
GEOBACH . . -
BLCK + - -
OTHR + -
OIVORC - + f
SINGL . + +
AGE + + +
FEMALE + + +
TIG . + +
ADD PAY + .
NREBONUS . + +
CONT EXP . + +
E5 + + +
E7 - + +
Source: Author
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The following variables were not included in the model
in order to prevent perfect multicollinearity : HSG, CAUC,
MARRIED, and E6. These variables had the highest freguency,
within their category, within the sample. It must also be
noted that the reliability of the overall hypothesized signs
are not very good. Many of these variables would affect the
probability of being promoted in one direction while affecting
the probability of being discharged in the other direction.
The degree to which direction would be affected would result
in the overall sign. It is very difficult to estimate that
effect or even explain it. This is the rationale for having
three columns for hypothesized signs in Table 10.
2. The Main Logistic Model
The main model is composed of independent variables
which would potentially influence and affect the dependent
variable, or the probability an individual Marine will take
the VSI/SSB exit bonus. Table 11 lists the variables and








NODUTY - OTHR -
NHSG - DIVORC +
COLL + SINGL -








PI - AGE -
F_RCTRDI -r FEMALE +
PFTSCORE - TIG T
N_ADDMOS - ADSPOUS
DEPLTIME + ADD_PAY -
DCTB YRS - NREBONUS +
SECUR_DU + ADMINSUP +
NFMF_DU - CSS_T +
RCTG_DU T CSS_NT —
INDEP_DU + GARSUP +
SCH DU - ELECAVN +
DAUS DR1 + E5 +
N INMOS + E7 -
GEOBACH + TT_EASSQ -
NBORNCIT - BIAS ->
BLCK -
Source: Author
The omitted conditions to prevent multicollinearity
are HSG, CAUC, MARRIED, FMF_DU, CMBTARMS , and E6 . Chapter V
will further explain these models, variables, signs, and
coefficients. One reason for the large number of independent
variables is the desire to control for as many aspects of quit
behavior as possible, so the independent effects of the
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quality variables can be measured and interpreted with a sense
of confidence.
A second reason is to lend some sense of reliability
and consistency to the bivariate information by obtaining the
statistical significance and signs of an assortment of
variables from the multivariate model. As previously
discussed, this will provide added depth to any bivariate
information obtained. Quality Marines are not the sole
concern of HQMC and this study. The profile of those taking
the VSI/SSB incentive is also important to policy decision
makers for refining or modifying current separation incentive
policy decisions. The bivariate analysis aids tremendously in
determining this profile.
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IV. PRESENTATION OF DATA COLLECTED
The data set furnished by HQMC was created from the
Headquarters Master File (HMF) . The HMF is created quarterly
and contains approximately 440 fields of information. Since
this study is concerned about fiscal year (FY) 1992 phase I-
III offerinqs of the VSI/SSB proqram, the extract of the HMF
includes cross-sectional data taken durinq the period when
Marines needed to make the decision to accept or reject these
VSI/SSB incentives. This period is December 1991 throuqh May
1992.
The data set includes all Marines eligible for the three
phased offerinqs. As discussed in Chapter III, E4s were
dropped leavinq E5s, E6s, and E7s. Other enlisted pay-qrades
were not eliqible and are not included in the data set. Data
not found in the HMF that were merqed into this data set, were
PI data. This data came from Manpower Manaqement (MM)
division, HQMC and came from sensitive, performance evaluation
data files. This is the reason that half of the observations
within the sample are missinq Pis. Criteria used for basinq
the retention of information within data files is different
between the HMF and the performance evaluation files.
The total number of observations at the beqinninq of the
study was 9,772. Because of missinq observations in some of
the variables, the initial Heckman model was run usinq 8,821
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observations. The large number of observations missing Pis
reduced the sample size (n) for the main model to 4,232, still
a relatively large sample.
The original sample size was used for the bivariate
profile. This allowed for a more accurate look at actual FY92
VSI/SSB results. An administrative close-out date of 30 June
1992 was established for those Marines taking the FY92
VSI/SSB. The 1,013 total takers by 30 June were merged into
this data set for use as the response variable. Total FY92
takers, however, totaled 1,083 by the end of the fiscal year.
Some 70 takers, or 0.7% of the overall sample, were treated as
non-takers in this study due to the pre-established close-out
date.
Profiling and scrubbing the data encompassed using three
statistical techniques, creation of frequency tables, the
running of simple correlations, and the use of cross-
tabulation tables. Frequencies for the variables of the first
or larger sample are located in Appendix B, while frequencies
for the smaller sample (those with Pis) are included in
Appendix C.
Certain variables were eliminated because of large numbers
of missing values, i.e., AFQT scores and a variable for weight
control and military appearance. A majority of the variables
were well represented by a large percentage of overall
observations.
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Results of the Pearson simple correlation analysis warned
of some collinearity problems. YOS had a high correlation
with E5, E7, AGE, TIG, and PFTSCORE. TIG was highly
correlated with YOS, TT_EAS, and AGE. Finally, AGE showed a
high correlation with PFTSCORE, TIG, YOS, E5, and E7 . Table





YOS 1.00 .37 .79
TIG .37 1.00 .30
AGE .79 .30 1.00
E5 -.43 .18 -.36
E7 .59 -.22 .47
PFTSCORE -.28 -.14 -.28
Source: Author
No other significant problems or relationships surfaced
from simple correlation analysis. To get a better idea of
true multicollinearity within both multivariate models, linear
probability OLS regressions were run using the variance
inflation factor (VIF) procedure (See Appendix D) . This
procedure detects collinearity which ultimately makes the
parameter estimates in a logit regression unstable and
consequently less reliable [Ref. 39:pp. 274-276]. Both models
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indicated YOS as having the most collinearity , followed by
AGE, TIG, and E7 . After pulling YOS out of both models, all
other variables registered within normal VIF parameters.
Instead of using YOS for a tenure variable, AGE was used for
two reasons. First, prior studies have found AGE to be a
statistically significant variable in affecting job satisfac-
tion and job turnover. Secondly, AGE was also found to be
statistically significant in the OLS regression in the main
model
.
In order to ensure some detectable effect and variation
between the independent variables and the dependent variable
in both models, cross-tabulations were done. It was
important, for the specification of the main model, to see if
takers of the VSI/SSB were represented within each of the
dummy variable categories. If this did not occur, the model
could not produce a coefficient (parameter estimate) for the
variable (s) having no VSI/SSB takers. Without some takers in
each category, the model cannot measure effects of that
independent variable on the dependent variable. Similarly,
for the Heckman model, it was important to see if those who
possessed Pis were represented in each of the dummy variables
being specified in that equation. It was discovered that all
the variables originally to be included in the main model, had
representative VSI/SSB takers. The variables in the Heckman
model also had sufficient representation of those having a PI.
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Appendices E and F display cross-tabulations for the Heckman
model and the main model, respectively.
In order to interpret the coefficients of the main logit
model, in terms of a base case representing the "average
Marine" eligible for the VSI/SSB program, it was necessary to
determine statistical means for all of the quantitative
variables. These means are listed in Table 13.
TABLE 13
MEANS & STANDARD DEVIATIONS
OF QUANTITATIVE VARIABLES
Variable Means Standard Deviation
DEPLTIME 1.94 3 . 14
NUMDEP 2.57 1. 45
DCTB_YRS 1.27 1. 65
AGE 33.03 3 .70
TIG 3.97 2.41
DAUS_DR1 4.51 4 . 53
ADD_PAY 0.92* 2 .46
YOS 13.35 3 . 01
GTGCTTOT 106.46 14.55
PI 8.43 0. 52
PFTSCORE 217.16 64.70
TT_EASSQ 1114.99 1250.01
BIAS 1.81 1. 33
* Value expressed in $25 increments.
Source: Author
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The following variables were omitted from the main model







. Table 14 displays the variable coding for the
Heckman model. Note that two variables in the Heckman model
REBONUS and ADDMOS are coded slightly different than two
similar variables in the main model, NREBONUS and N_ADDMOS.
The only diffarence is interpretation of the sign of each set
of variables. This was done for ease of calculation and
interpretation of the coefficients of the main model. Table




Variable Explanation Cod i ng
NHSG Ion-high school grad. 1 = Yes
= Otherwise
COLL Possesses some college. Same
F RCTRDI Former recruiter or drill instructor. Same
ADDMOS Possesses an additional MOS. Same
GEOBACH Is a geographic bachelor. Same
BLCK Race is black. Same
OTHR ice is other than black or Caucasian. Same
DIVORC Marital status is divorced. Same
SINGL Marital status is single. Same
FEMALE Gender is female Same
REBONUS Has received a reenlistment bonus. Same
CONT_EXP Has an active duty service contract to expire
between 1 Dec. 91 - 31 May 92.
Same
E5 Is an E5 or sergeant. Same







NOOUTY Currently in an other than full duty status. 1 - Yes
= Otherwise
NHSG Non-high school grad. Same
COLL Possesses some college. Same
R RCTRDI Former recruiter or drill instructor. Same
N_ADDMOS Does not possess an additional military occupational
specialty.
Same
SECUR DU Currently serving on security duty. Same
NFMF OU Currently serving on non-FMF duty. Same
RCTG DU Currently serving on recruiting duty. Same
INDEP DU Currently serving on independent (other) duty. Same
SCH DU Currently serving on school duty, student or staff. Same
N INMOS Serving on a tour not in one's primary MOS. Same
GEOBACH Is a geographic bachelor. Same
BLCK Race is black. Same
OTHR Race is other than black or Caucasian. Same
NBORNCIT Not a born U.S. citizen. Same
DIVORC Marital status is divorced. Same
SINGL Marital status is single. Same
FEMALE Gender is female. Same
NREBONUS Has never received a reenlistment bonus. Same
ADMINSUP Possesses an administration/supply occ field. Same
CSS_T Possesses a technical combat service support occ
field.
Same
CSS_NT Possesses a non-technical combat service support occ
field.
Same
GARSUP Possesses a garrison support occ field. Same
ELECAVN Possesses an electronic or aviation occ field. Same
E5 Is an E5 or sergeant. Same
E7 Is an E7 or gunnery sergeant. Same
Source: Author
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Within this data set, as with most data, come problems
with variable make-up. Already mentioned are GEOBACH and some
of the duty variables. The largest problem variable with the
duty variables is SCH_DU. Marine Command Codes (MCCs) lumped
students and staff together under the same school codes. This
makes it extremely difficult, virtually impossible, to
separate students from staff [Ref. 43]. Nevertheless, with
only 6.9% of the overall sample size being grouped into
SCH_DU, a further breakout of students and staff would be very
small
.
The final concern with this data set is the degree it
represents a random cross-section of all enlisted, careerist
Marines. It is somewhat selective in terms of the VSI/SSB
eligibility criteria listed below:
Has served on active duty for more than six years before
5 December 1991.
Has completed the initial term of enlistment including
any extensions thereto, or the initial period of
obligated service prior to separation.
Has served at least five years of continuous active duty
immediately preceding the date of separation.
Is not immediately eligible for retired or retainer pay
based on military service upon separation.
Is a regular officer or enlisted or a reserve officer on
the active duty list.
Must be eligible for reenlistment in accordance with MCO
P1040.31_ para. 4102(A)-(Q).
Must possess an MOS listed in one of the three ALMARS
published for the phase I-III offerings of VSI/SSB.
[Ref. 44:p. 3]
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The last two criteria, listed above, lend themselves
toward the introduction of selectivity bias of the study's
sample. Obviously, not all careerist Marines will be eligible
for reenlistment . This automatically eliminates a lower
caliber or lower quality Marine from the sample. This is
particularly important to remember, when in the next chapter,
the discussion of lower quality Marines will not include those
ineligible for reenlistment. In other words, lower quality
will refer only to those lower quality Marines within the
sample.
Secondly, the last criterion selects out only those MOSs
listed by HQMC in the three basic ALMARS (007-92, 064-92, and
133-92). As already discussed in Chapter I, the MOSs
represented are those MOSs for which related equipment is
being phased out of DOD inventories, or those suffering from
promotion stagnation. This does not include every MOS within
the Marine Corps, but it does include 28 of the 36 enlisted
occupational fields [Ref. 45]. Those occupational fields not
represented are Ammunition and Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(23) , Food Service (33) , Auditing, Finance, and Accounting
(34) , Data Systems (40) , Marine Corps Exchange (41) , Aviation
Safety (66) , Weather Service (68) , and Air Traffic Control and
Enlisted Flight Crews (73) . These fields are included in
every occupational variable category developed for this study
except CMBTARMS and ELECAVN (See Table 5) . Even with the
absence of eight occupational fields, the aggregation of these
69
fields into job-type categories or groupings should provide
sufficient job related characteristics to generate variable
interaction within the main model, even if some occupational
field-specific influences are not present.
Even though selectivity bias may exist within the sample,
it remains to be seen if at any time in the future all MOSs
will be open to the VSI/SSB program, or that reenlistment-
ir :>le Marines will be offered a VSI/SSB or similar type
program. The point to be made is that the overall population
of enlisted, careerist Marines may never entirely be eligible
for separation incentive programs such as the VSI/SSB. The
concern (selectivity bias) then may be, how does a researcher
best sample this new population. Even under this new
criterion, the sample in this study, with half of the original
samrle eliminated because of the lack of data on the PI
variable, would still potentially possess selectivity bias.
Again, that's the purpose for the Heckman procedure.
Finally, it is important to reiterate, the data set used
in this study has never been used before, by other
researchers. As in many studies such data sources as the U.S.
Census Bureau, the 1974 Enlisted Utilization Survey, the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-1987, the 1985 DOD
Member Survey, etc. have been worked and reworked. The data
set in this study is unique and readily accessible to manpower
planners. It possesses actual quit behavior, existing
performance measures, and a wide selection of archival
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information suited to proxy many aspects of human behavior for
the study of job turnover in a downsizing environment.
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V. DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
A. INTRODUCTION
The organization of Chapter V is designed to facilitate
understanding of the empirical results obtained by both the
bivariate and multivariate analyses that have been tied
directly into each research guestion. Since some guestions
rely on both analytical technigues, it better serves the
purpose of understanding to introduce the results and
interpretations together, in direct response to the guestions,
namely the main research guestion and the four subsidiary
guestions. Conseguently , this chapter will be broken into two
major sections. Each section will attempt to address the
research guestions through a series of guantitative
interpretations and gualitative assessments.
B. MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION
Are a disproportionate number of guality Marines taking
the VSI/SSB voluntary separation bonuses ? One key to
addressing this guestion is to define, "guality Marine." In
fact, one of the subsidiary guestions is, "What are some
potential variables to proxy the guality characteristics of
enlisted Marines?" This guestion was essentially answered in
Chapter III. Through that detailed description and specifica-
tion, seven variables to proxy guality were identified and
extracted from the data set: PI, NODUTY, COLL, GTGCTTOT,
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F_RCTRDI, N_ADDMOS, and PFTSCORE (See Table 16). The author
defines quality in terms of these seven quantifyable
variables. These variables revolved around the notion of
overall job performance, not the degree of technical training
or job criticality. Using this workable and quantifyable





NODUTY Currently in an other than full duty
status.
COLL Possesses some college.
F_RCTRDI Former recruiter or drill instructor.
N_ADDMOS Does not possess an additional military
occupational specialty.
PI Performance index calculated from Marine
Corps fitness reports.
PFTSCORE Score on Marine Corps physical fitness
test.
GTGCTTOT GT score from ASVAB test.
Source Author
Table 17 reflects the results of a bivariate cross-
tabulation made between takers of the VSI/SSB program and each
of the four dummy quality variables, plus four successive
categories of PI. Displayed are three columns of numbers.
The first column is the take rate expressed as a percentage of
those Marines taking VSI/SSB who possess the quality attribute
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represented by the variable. The second column represents the
same takers but expressed as a percentage of the total takers
in the original sample (931) . The third column represents the
number of Marines who possess the attribute as a percentage of
the total original sample (9,118) of Marines. Columns two and










PI 7.0-7.4 16.48 0.86 0.62
PI 7.5-7.9 17.55 2.63 1.78
PI 8.0-8.4 15.84 6.68 5.17
PI 8.5-9.0 9.62 7.88 10.04
NODUTY 3.45 0.11 0.32
COLL 8.24 8.70 10.78
F RCTRDI 6.55 17.08 26.64
N ADDMOS 12.28 55.32 45.99
Source: Author
To determine whether a disproportionate number of quality
Marines are taking the VSI/SSB, it is necessary to see the
profile of those taking within an attribute compared to the
total number in the sample. The average take-rate for the
entire sample was 10.21%. The take-rate for each quality
attribute can be compared to the entire sample's average take
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rate to see if a greater/less proportion of Marines are taking
the program. In a similar manner, columns two and three show
a comparison between the percentage of total takers within an
attribute and the percentage of that attribute represented in
the total sample. If both percentages are similar, then the
percentage of total takers characterizes about the same
representation as that attribute does within the total sample.
Take-rates will also be very close to the average take rate of
10.21 in this instance.
These two methods of comparison give the same result but
from slightly different perspectives. The second method
provides some idea of the magnitude of the representation of
Marines within an attribute and how that might affect the
overall sample. As discussed in Chapter III, the bivariate
results are based on the original or larger sample. This
provides an idea of what actually happened in FY92, by
attribute.
Note, that since PI was a quantitative variable, it was
broken down into four components. Thus broken down, it was
included with the dummy variables in the bivariate analyses.
The effect of the other two quantitative variables would be
observed through the multivariate model, i.e., the sign, which
would indicate the direction of their relationship with the
dependent variable. Also requiring extraction from the
multivariate model is the level of significance of each of the
quality variables. The intent is to determine if there is any
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statistical significance in the effect of the independent
variables on the dependent variable. Statistical significance
would strengthen the results of the bivariate analysis.
Table 18 shows the results of the main logit regression on
the quality proxies. Appendix G contains the actual SAS









F_RCTRDI 0.3431 0. 0784**
PFTSCORE -0.00247 0.0032*
N_ADDMOS 0.3775 0.0091*
* Significant at the 0.05 level
** Significant at the 0.10 level
Source: Author
Table 18 shows four quality variables as statistically
significant: PFTSCORE and N_ADDMOS at the .05 level and COLL
and F_RCTRDI at the .10 level. The other three quality
variables are considered to have statistically insignificant
effects on the probability that a Marine will take the VSI/SSB
incentive.
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In other words, each quality variable may have a
higher/lower take rate than the sample's average, but
according to the main logit model the effects of PFTSCORE,
N_ADDMOS, COLL, and F_RCTRDI may also significantly contribute
toward a Marine's decision to take/not take the VSI/SSB while
NODUTY, GTGCTTOT, and PI do not necessarily affect this
decision. Remember, these effects are from individual
variables, all other independent variables in the equation
held constant (ceterus peribus) . This result may imply that
certain quality variables based on performance may potentially
have an influence on a Marine's job-turnover decision within
an environment characterized by downsizing and pecuniary
voluntary separation incentives.
The bivariate comparisons indicate that all PI groupings
but one have a higher-than-average take-rate. The best
performers (PI 8.5-9.0) have lower than average take rates
(9.62%). However, the logit model suggests PI does not
necessarily affect the decision to take VSI/SSB. In addition,
the sign for PI is positive suggesting the higher the PI the
greater probability a Marine will take VSI/SSB. One must
interpret then that the bivariate profile shows that in FY92
very high performers stayed in while the balance took the
VSI/SSB at higher-than-average rates. This result is not
clear and definitely not conclusive. The higher performers
may feel greater job security or that they may have greater
career opportunities. It is difficult to assess this
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perception since the multivariate model suggests that the
variable DI has no linear relationship with job-turnover
behavior x. is situation.
Results for NODUTY include a lower-than-average take-rate,
3.45%, and an insignificant logit coefficient with a negative
sign. Again, the logit model suggests NODUTY may have no
independent effect on the dependent variable. The bivariate
profile shows that for FY92 those on a no-duty status tended
to tak :nuch-less-than-average rate.
The final insignificant guality variable included in the
model was GTGCTTOT. Even though it had a negative sign,
suggesting the higher the GT score the lower the probability
of taking VSI/SSB, the insignificance indicates a potential
lack of eiiect. This doesn't appear surprising based upon
much of the previous research which has been inconclusive upon
whether Armed Forces entrance test results affect careerist
retention.
N_ADDMOS was a significant variable at the 95% confidence
level, and it had a positive relationship to the dependent
variable "his suggests the lower-guality Marines, those not
posst._ j ^auitional MOSs, will have higher probabilities of
taking the VSI/SSB. Bivariate results are consistent with
this finding, showing a higher-than-average take-rate, 12.28%.
One wonders if these Marines perceived a closing of
opportunities within the Corps since they lack an additional
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specialty. This in turn may influence their turnover
behavior.
PFTSCORE was also significant at the 95% confidence level.
The negative coefficient indicates the higher the score the
less the probability of taking VSI/SSB. As with GTGCTTOT, a
bivariate profile would not afford any additional insight. As
discussed in Chapter III, the PFT score indicates a balanced
excellence of a quality performer.
The model suggested that those Marines with some college
(COLL) had less of a tendency to take VSI/SSB. This variable
was significant at the 90% confidence level. The bivariate
profile also was consistent with this finding, showing COLL as
having a lower-than-average take-rate, 8.24%. This would
suggest that those with some college tended to stay and that
in FY92 they indeed did stay.
The final significant variable, F_RCTRDI, was significant
at the 90% confidence level and possessed a positive coeffi-
cient. An interesting inconsistency exists with this
variable. Even though the multivariate model suggests that
having been a former recruiter or drill instructor has an
independent effect of increasing the probability a Marine will
take the VSI/SSB, the bivariate profile indicates that in FY92
former recruiters and drill instructors actually took the
program at a much-lower-than-average rate. This makes drawing
conclusions very difficult.
79
Generally speaking, the multivariate model indicated that
some quality variables or attributes have a statistically
significant effect on whether a Marine takes the VSI/SSB. The
bivariate profile indicated historical take-rates for
different categories of Marines based on FY92 data. Some
inconsistency exists between the two analyses for some of the
variables.
As for Marines with some college, additional MOSs and high
PFT scores, there is statistical support to indicate that
these Marines will have lower probabilities of taking the
VSI/SSB than the average Marine eligible for the program. The
bivariate analysis supports this contention with lower-than-
average take-rates. Variables such as PI, GTGCTTOT, NODUTY,
and F_RCTRDI either showed inconsistencies between
multivariate and bivariate results or merely were
statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, the bivariate
profile for these last four variables does reflect FY92 data.
C. SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Two of the four subsidiary questions have already been
addressed. The first is, "What are some potential variables
to proxy the quality characteristics of enlisted, careerist
Marines?" Chapter III has adequately addressed this question
within the context of the available data. The second question
is, "What control variables should be used to best account for
other factors affecting a Marine's decision to take/not take
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the VSI/SSB bonus?" This has also been sufficiently covered
in Chapter III.
A third question will be addressed here: "What may be the
effect of the quality variables on the probability that a
careerist Marine will take the VSI/SSB bonus?" In answering
this question, one must determine, by using the coefficients
in the main logit model, the magnitude of effect on the
probability. Table 19 shows these effects for each of the
significant quality variables identified in the "case" column.
TABLE 19
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This allows for the creation of a base case which represents
the average Marine in the sample. By varying only one of the
significant variables at a time, four independent cases were
developed. Each case represents only the change in the one
variable indicated in the case column. This allows for
interpretation of the magnitude of effect on the probability
resulting from a change in the variable relative to the base
case. In the case of PFTSCORE, the results are based on a
change of 10 points of PFT score.
The base case is based on the following average Marine
profiled by this data set: A 33.03 year old, Caucasian, male,
E6, on full-duty status, high school graduate with no college,
having a GT score of 106.46, a PI of 8.43, not having a
recruiter (8411) or drill instructor (8511) additional MOS but
having at least one other additional MOS, a PFT score of
217. l^ having 1.94 months of accumulated deployed time,
having been at his duty station for 1.27 years, being on FMF
duty, in his primary combat arms MOS, not a geographic
bachelor, born a U.S. citizen, married but not to an active
duty spouse, with 2.57 dependents, having 3.97 years in grade,
receiving $24.25 in additional pay, having received a
reenlistment bonus at least once, and having been back in the
continental U.S. (CONUS) for 4.51 years since his last
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unaccompanied overseas tour. This average Marine also has a
TT_EASSQ of 1114.99 or 28.19 months to EAS . Finally, the BIAS
value of this base case is 1.81.
It appears N_ADDMOS has the greatest effect, with a change
from the base case probability of 1.09%. The other three
variables have smaller effects. As previously discussed,
these four variables may have a statistically significant
effect on a Marine's decision to take VSI/SSB, but one can see
by the coefficient interpretations that the effect of most of
these quality variables is not very large.
This begs the question. Did any other variables within
the model have significant effects? This question is embodied
into the fourth and final subsidiary research question: "Of
those Marines taking VSI/SSB, do trends appear in their
attribute profile, and if so, what are those trends and their
effects on the probability a Marine will take the bonus?"
Since it is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyze
each of the control variables to the extent of the quality
variables, the next several pages will focus on statistically
significant trends identified from the main logit model. Some
mention of the bivariate profile will also be made. Table 20
displays the control variables using the same format as Table
17. Table 21 lists the logit regression results for the


































































































































































































































* Significant at the .05 level
Source: Author
** Significant at the .10 level
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Tables 22 and 23 provide for an interpretation of the
magnitude of the effects on the probability that a Marine will
take the VSI/SSB. Each of the statistically significant
control variables are listed by case, with their corresponding
percentage probability. This probability is calculated using
the same logistic equation mentioned earlier in this chapter.
TABLE 2 2









INDEP DU 3.97 1.52
SCH_DU 1.30 -1.15




AGE (1 Year) 2.29 -0.16
TT_EASSQ (6 Months) 2.42 -0.03















DAUS_DR1 (1 Year) 2.40 -0.05
Source: Author
Nine control variables were statistically significant at
the .05 level and three variables at the .10 level. These
will be the variables discussed in the next several pages.
AGE, a tenure variable and E5, which could be interpreted
as proxying very little tenure, were both highly significant.
As AGE increased, the probability a Marine would take VSI/SSB
went down. Conversely so with E5s, the results of which seem
consistent with organizational theory on tenure's affect on
job turnover. The magnitude of effects on the probability for
each of these variables does differ. For every additional
year of age, the probability is lowered .16%, whereas if a
Marine is an E5 the effect on the probability is raised
27.75%. This is an astronomical effect within the context of
this study. E5s cannot retire as sergeants due to service
limitations. On the other hand, certain E6s and most E7s have
an opportunity to reach 2 0-year retirement. This fact may be
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affecting job-turnover behavior. Even though the E7 variable
was not significant, it possessed a negative relationship
(lowers the probability) with the dependent variable. This
result also seems consistent with organizational behavior
theory of job turnover.
The Marine Corps is targeting E5s under the current policy
governing the VSI/SSB program. The bivariate profile also
shows a tremendously high take-rate for E5s, 26.56%, while E6s
and E7s have below-average take-rates, at 8.20% and 3.55%,
respectively.
Two duty variables were significant at the 95% confidence
level, INDEP_DU and SCH_DU. Interestingly, both had opposite
effects with similar magnitudes. Those people on independent
duty had a higher-than-average probability of taking the
VSI/SSB, while conversely so for those in school or for
permanent personnel assigned to school commands. INDEP_DU
raises the probability of taking 1.52% and SCH_DU lowers the
probability 1.15%. The bivariate profile is consistent with
both sets of results showing INDEP_DU with a higher-than-
average take-rate of 16.78% and SCH_DU at a lower-than-average
take-rate of 5.34%.
Marines on independent duty have a higher-than-normal
exposure to civilian counterparts, private businesses, and
community activities while in the line of duty. The
probability of Marines on this type of duty seeing greater
employment alternatives or avenues would logically seem
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greater, whereas on school duty Marines have virtually no
contact with the civilian community through job-related
activities.
School duty tends to be a reward for good performers,
especially from the aspect of a student. It could mean a new
and better job as a follow-on to school or it could mean
perceived higher opportunities for promotion. Either way,
both notions have been shown to increase retention behavior.
Two of the five occupational field variables were
significant at the 95% confidence level (CSS_T, ELECAVN) and
one at the 90% confidence level (GARSUP) . As one might
expect, the two most technical occupational fields, CSS_T and
ELECAVN, had significant, positive relationships with the
dependent variable. Both had the second greatest positive
effect of all the control variables. Both CSS_T and ELECAVN
had a 3.27% higher probability of taking VSI/SSB than the base
case. This is not an unfamiliar phenomenon for the military
services. The SRBs were designed to counter this type of
phenomenon under normal environmental conditions of retention
[Ref. 27]. It is logical that these specialties, with their
high cost of training and high perception of marketability,
would leave the Marine Corps at higher rates under conditions
of voluntary separation bonuses in a downsizing environment.
In fact, the bivariate profile shows ELECAVN and CSS_T Marines
leaving at rates 9.37% and 11.20% higher than average.
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Similarly, GARSUP had a significant positive relationship
with the dependent variable. The magnitude of its effect was
also relatively high. Marines in the GARSUP occupational
field had a 1.39% higher probability of taking VSI/SSB than
the bas ~ case, or average Marine. Inconsistency is born out
with th ake rates displayed in the bivariate profile
results. GARSUP Marines took VSI/SSB at a rate 1% lower than
the average Marine. This result makes it extremely difficult
to explain what is happening or why this phenomenon exists.
GARS TTr> s are not necessarily technically trained, but
the Ma^ ps gives them unigue general training as opposed
to technical specific training. This general training has
historically been marketable within the civilian job market
since it carries tremendous skill transfer from military to
civilian occupations [Ref. 46:pp. 152-154]. It appears this
factor may have a significant effect on a Marine's decision to
take VSI/SSB, but it apparently did not necessarily affect the
FY92 eligible population.
Two var^- u les classified as demographic, BLCK and FEMALE
were ;ant at the 95% and 90% confidence levels,
r _y. The fact a Marine was black decreased the
prv ^ility (.79%) of taking the VSI/SSB. Consistent with the
bivariate results, blacks took the VSI/SSB at a rate 2.73%
lower than average. Perceptions of job opportunities in the
Corps, versus in the civilian community, may have some
influence in a black Marine's decision to take or not take.
90
Traditionally, a high level of labor-market discrimination
exists for blacks in the civilian labor market [Ref. 46:pp.
535-537]. The Marine Corps may be an alternative to avoiding
being placed in such a market. Females, on the other hand,
have a 1.43% greater probability of taking the VSI/SSB.
Consistent with the bivariate profile, females took VSI/SSB at
a 1.41% higher-than-average rate. Reasons for this could vary
significantly. Elements such as an environment characterized
by male dominance, sexual harassment, threat of combat duty,
or new rising issues of mandatory combat arms MOS assignment,
could be cause for distrust, anxiety, and consequently job
dissatisfaction. Most reasons, including these, are
speculative and not empirically supported.
The last control variable which was significant at the 95%
confidence level was TT_EASSQ. This variable is difficult to
interpret since it was modeled as a quadratic function. As
such, Table 22 shows two separate cases for this variable.
Each gives some idea of the level of magnitude TT_EASSQ had on
the dependent variable. As time to EAS squared becomes
greater, the probability that a Marine will take VSI/SSB gets
lower. In the case of six months to EAS, the probability is
reduced .03%, while 12 months to EAS reduces the probability
.13%. Even though the effect is very small, it is a
statistically significant phenomenon. Evidently, the decision
to take VSI/SSB and leave the Corps occurs very near a
Marine's end of active service.
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This control variable hints at explaining why any E6s or
E7s would take the VSI/SSB when retirement is so close.
Either lucrative job offers exist or honest commanders inform
those substandard performing E6s and E7s, with near term EASs,
that the chance of reenlistment is remote. Without this
reenlistment , the rapidly approaching retirement is no longer
a reality.
The last control variable significant at the 90%
confidence level was DAUS_DR1, or the number of years a Marine
has been back in CONUS since the last unaccompanied overseas
tour. For each year a Marine is back the probability he/she
takes VSI/SSB is lowered .05%. As with TT_EASSQ, the effect
is small. It appears to be yet another minor factor in
influencing a Marine's decision to take or reject the VSI/SSB
bonus.
A variable which must be explained that was included in
the model as specified in Chapter III, is BIAS. Remember, the
BIAS variable was the predicted value's odds ratio from the
Heckman procedural model. The BIAS coefficient detects and
compensates for possible selectivity bias created by selecting
the sub-sample of Marines having the PI variable. This BIAS
variable was significant at the .05 level, strongly indicating
the presence of selectivity bias. The coefficient -0.7134
adjusts for this selectivity bias by ultimately influencing
the magnitude of effect of the other variables through the
logistic equation. Had not the Heckman procedure been used in
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this study, drastically different results would have been
realized, all because of selectivity bias.
Of the 11 significant control variables (excluding BIAS)
,
all but one (GARSUP) had results consistent with the bivariate
profile. These variables will be further discussed in Chapter
VI.
D. SUMMARY
Four of the seven quality variables were statistically
significant in the multivariate (logit) model. The bivariate
profile displayed some interesting relationships, some of
which were inconsistent with the multivariate analysis.
A total of 12 control variables (including BIAS) were
statistically significant. Several relationships consistent
with organizational behavior theory of job turnover and
military retention existed. The bivariate profile for the
control variables was consistent with the multivariate results
in all but one case.
It must be noted that the bivariate profile covered
virtually the entire FY92 eligible enlisted population (E4s
excluded) for VSI/SSB, a total of 9,118 Marines. Of the total
1,001 FY92 E5-E7 takers, this profile included 931 of those,
or 93% of the total number of takers. Only 7% of the total
takers were treated as non-takers by this analysis. The
analysis thus yielded a very accurate profile of Marines who
actually took the VSI/SSB program in FY92. This information,
coupled with the statistically significant effects certain
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variables had on Marines 7 decisions to take or not take the
bonus, lead to some valid conclusions, which are discussed
next, in Chapter VI.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter VI will present conclusions and recommendations
based on the results of the preceding chapter. Specific
research weaknesses are also addressed for the benefit of
future researchers and interested readers.
An important caveat to drawing any conclusions from
statistical data is the up-front concern of how the data are
analyzed. The theme of bivariate-versus-multivariate analysis
has prevailed throughout this thesis. There is no great
"truth" here as to which of the two techniques is correct.
Both can provide useful information and insights, and when
each compliments the other the logical assumption which can be
made is that each possesses strong inferential explanatory
power for the data. Chapter V presented an array of results.
One important consideration to keep in mind is that many
characteristics of one variable were controlled by other
variables within the multivariate model, i.e., Marines on
INDEP_DU also typically draw additional pay and have
additional MOSs, both of which are controlled for by the
variables ADD_PAY and N_ADDMOS, also included in the model.
This control assists in isolating as much independent effect
one variable may possibly have on the probability a Marine
takes VSI/SSB. This is a great statistical advantage of
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multivariate econometric modeling. Bivariate analysis does
not possess such statistical controls but does profile actual
occurrences within a sample or population. Inferential
explanatory power may be present in bivariate analysis; it
simply lacks the statistical support of multivariate analysis.
It appears, though, in this thesis that most of the
multivariate results are consistent with the bivariate
results. A few exceptions exist. This chapter will finish
answering various research guestions that remain to be
answered.
B. RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS
This section will attempt to answer the two remaining
unanswered research guestions: (1) Are a disproportionate
number of guality Marines taking the VSI/SSB? (2) Of those
taking the VSI/SSB, what trends appear in their attribute
profile? The other research guestions have been answered in
Chapter III and Chapter V.
1. Question 1
The answer to the first guestion is unclear. As
indicated in Chapter V, results are varied. Out of seven
variables making up the definition of guality, four variables
were significant. Of these four, PFTSCORE and COLL showed
that high guality Marines are taking at a less-than-average
rate and probability. F_RCTRDI showed inconsistency, not
allowing for a clear-cut conclusion. The N_ADDMOS variable
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showed, to some degree, lower-quality Marines are taking at a
higher rate and with greater probability.
Other quality variables proved either statistically
insignificant or were inconsistent in the bivariate/
multivariate comparison. Since the PI variable permitted for
a bivariate profile to be made by score ranges, it is
interesting to note in Table 24 the six highest performance
indices. Table 24 is formatted in the same manner as Tables
17 and 20. Even though the average take-rate of these six
high PI indices combined is below average, Table 24 shows only
31.35% of the overall sample as having lower-than-average
take-rates (PI 9.0-8.8). Tables 17 and 24 show that about
68.65% are taking at a higher-than-average rate.
TABLE 2 4
BIVARIATE RESULTS







PI 9.0 4.56 2.81 7.50
PI 8.9 5.72 5.44 11.56
PI 8.8 9.46 9.57 12.29
PI 8.7 10.27 9.19 10.87
PI 8.6 12.93 10.69 10.05
PI 8.5 14.78 9.57 7.86
Source: Author
97
The PI variable, even though statistically insigni-
ficant, also has a positive relationship with the probability
that a Marine will take VSI/SSB, as indicated by the main
logit model. There appears, therefore, to be slightly rore
data to support the conclusion that quality Marines are not
taking VSI/SSB at higher rates yet enough data exists which is
inconsistent or contrary. This sheds doubt on any major
conclusion which can be drawn on quality Marines, as defined
in terms of an aggregation of variables. Conclusions can be
drawn, as they have already, about individual quality
variables. The problem exists when an attempt is made to
combine the measurements on several variables as an overall
definition of quality.
Jackofsky's hypothesis that job performance affects an
individual's ease of movement, desirability of movement, and
expectation of employer's action to fire, demote, or transfer,
is not conclusively supported or refuted by this thesis [Ref.
6]. It is interesting that a direct performance measure
derived from Marine Corps fitness reports yields statistically
insignificant results. Again, it is important to point out
that some quality factors influence a Marine's decision to
take VSI/SSB; but once an overall quality definition is put
together by an aggregating of several variables, results and
conclusions become very fuzzy. If the Marine Corps is
perceived as losing a higher proportion of quality people
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because of VSI/SSB, it is not conclusively evident by this
study.
2 . Question 2
In response to the second unanswered question,
concerning trends in the attribute profile of those taking
VSI/SSB, there appears to be four major trends. Tenure,
certain demographic characteristics, duty/ job, and occupa-
tional field are all variables or attributes that appear to
influence the choice behavior of Marines with respect to
VSI/SSB.
There is strong evidence that suggests tenure has a
significant effect on choice behavior, within the context of
this study. Not only are age and grade significant from both
a multivariate and bivariate perspective, but the magnitude of
both effects are very large, particularly that of grade. It
was surprising to see the E5 variable as statistically
significant while the E7 variable was not. The E7 take-rate
in FY92 was 6.66% less than average. Nevertheless, it appears
reasonable that the more time one has spent in the Marine
Corps, the less likely he/she is to take the exit bonus. E5s,
within the VSI/SSB eligible population, on average had 10.58
years in service while E7s averaged 15.89 years. E7s have
considerable time and effort invested in the organization.
The Marine Corps "way of life" is probably deeply entrenched
in a Marine with greater tenure. Job stability is also an
important concern of such a Marine.
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An E5, on the other hand, is young6 and only has
invested a few years in the organization. E5s may perceive
they are still young enough and possess the newly acquired,
military learned skills necessary to effectively enter the
civilian labor market. The time-value of money is also much
different between the older and younger Marines. Research has
shown that younger Marines have a much higher discount rate
and thus are prone to accept large stipends of money (bonuses)
quickly [Ref. 27]. Regardless of the rationale, tenure seems
to affect turnover behavior in a downsizing environment.
Secondly, two demographic variables identify two
groups of people prone to either taking or not taking the
VSI/SSB at higher rates with greater probabilities than
average. Blacks and females are these two groups. Both have
tendencies to take the VSI/SSB in opposite directions. Blacks
tend to take the VSI/SSB at lower rates, while females tend to
take the VSI/SSB at higher rates. Chapter V offered some
speculative reasons why these trends occur. The heart of the
issue seems to stem from some notion of discrimination, such
as blacks not desiring to enter into a civilian labor market
racked with wage and job discrimination or women not desiring
to remain in an occupation literally dominated by males,
enduring whatever level of gender discrimination may be
perceived to exist.
6E5s average age within the eligible VSI/SSB population was
30.23 years versus E7s average age of 35.63 years.
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Thirdly, duty/job appears to influence a Marine's
decision whether to take VSI/SSB or not. Once again, two
types of duty yield different, yet significant, results.
Those Marines on independent duty tend to take VSI/SSB,
whereas those in school or assigned to school commands tend
not to take. Summarizing the discussion in Chapter V, those
military jobs connected to the civilian community, business,
and influence seem prone to leaving the Marine Corps via the
VSI/SSB program. Independent duty away from major Marine
Corps establishments can be demanding and somewhat de-
motivating when one is accustomed to being surrounded by
fellow Marines with common problems and challenges.
Commradarie and esprit de corps could be lacking in this duty
environment. These are speculative reasons for the higher-
than-average take-rates and probabilities among Marines on
this particular type of duty.
On the other hand, jobs oriented toward motivating,
teaching, learning, warfighting, and the many other assorted
missions associated with school duty may have influenced a
Marine's decision not to take VSI/SSB. Perceived oppor-
tunities, either through promotion or reassignment, may also
have influenced the decision in the same direction.
Regardless, the magnitude of effect of both variables is
moderate in relation to the effects of the other variables.
Marines with technical occupational specialties tended
to take VSI/SSB at higher rates and have a greater probability
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to leave via VSI/SSB. This result has appeared in countless
retention studies of first-termers. The magnitude of effect
for the occupational field variables were relatively high.
Again, this result is consistent with prior research.
Selective reenlistment bonuses were designed to entice service
members highly trained or trained through costly means to
stay, resulting in lowered training costs and sustained
organizational effectiveness. As with SRBs, the Marine Corps
needs to monitor the targeted groups and goals for VSI/SSB
carefully. In a multivariate world, the targeting of one
particular group of people through an incentive program can
ultimately spillover into another group of people. In this
case, technical specialties have been targeted.
Overall, low tenured groups (E5s) , Marines on
independent duty, those in technical occupations, and possibly
females have been targeted through the Marine Corps FY92
VSI/SSB voluntary separation incentive program.
C. WEAKNESSES OF THE STUDY
Because of the desire of the study to explore the
relationships between quality variables, primarily PI, and the
dependent variable (probability of taking VSI/SSB) , the
original eligible population was reduced to less than half.
The Heckman procedure and the bivariate profile of all
eligibles adequately compensated for this weakness; yet not
having to perform such theoretical and technical statistical
procedures might have offered clearer support in more
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understandable terms. Future studies focusing on duty
variables, tenure variables, or occupational-field variables
should be able to dispense with these additional procedures.
Even though there were only 7% of overall takers not
treated as such, because of administrative problems when
formulating the data set, nevertheless some key data are
omitted. It remains to be seen whether this omission would
have affected the results in any significant way.
As in much of the previous research, survey data would be
the ideal method of ascertaining relationships between quit
behavior under pecuniary incentives and various behavioral
factors. One very important point to remember is that in the
current environment of budget austerity, costly ad hoc surveys
probably will not be affordable data alternatives. Instead,
pre-existing administrative data sets containing
socioeconomic, demographic, and military background variables
will be some of the only practical and affordable data
available. This study has shown that significant results can
be achieved through the use of such data.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Marine Corps has targeted certain populations or
groupings of Marines through the VSI/SSB program. Realizing
its initial desire to force shape by reducing and eliminating
MOSs tied to equipment phase-outs and to reduce promotion
stagnation through increased attrition in certain MOSs, the
Marine Corps may have stumbled into a spillover effect. It is
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not the purpose of this thesis to evaluate the force shaping
effectiveness of the current Marine Corps VSI/SSB policy,
rather it is the purpose to assess what groups of Marines have
been targeted by the VSI/SSB policy and to determine what
particular variables affect a Marine's decision to take or not
take VSI/SSB.
In order to determine a spillover effect, the Marine Corps
first needs to assess the effectiveness of the VSI/SSB policy
in terms of its accomplishments toward its force-shaping
objectives. Results from this type of an assessment should be
compared to the results of this study, whereby giving decision
makers empirical evidence of the effectiveness and potential
consequences of the policy. Since it is evident, through this
study, that the Marine Corps has targeted a disproportionately
high number of E5s through the VSI/SSB program, a question of
concern arises, "How are we decreasing promotion stagnation
when we discover E5s are taking the bonus at much higher-than-
average rates and with much higher probabilities to do so?"
Further study may assist in finding an answer.
Other groups such as those in technical occupational
fields, females, Marines on independent or school duty, and
blacks, have been significantly affected by the current
policy, but not to the extent as E5s. This is an area which
needs focus for future study, using FY93 data or aggregated
FY92 and FY93 data. Differences between who is taking the
VSI versus the SSB may be another way of determining whether
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any modification of the current policy is necessary. One may
find E5s almost exclusively taking the SSB. If E5s are not
the focus of the Marine Corps' force shaping objectives, but
rather E6s and E7s, then one may conclude that the VSI should
be increased or "sweetened" to entice the more senior pay-
grades. The 15-year retirement option may also be a viable
strategy, pending its current legal review.
The Marine Corps currently holds exit surveys on many
Marines recently discharged. The results of these surveys are
invaluable in validating studies such as this one. Another
recommendation would be to use the discharge survey data and
determine why Marines decided to take the VSI/SSB and leave.
A parallel study, using discharge survey data taken from
Marines discharged before the inception of the VSI/SSB
program, could be conducted to determine why Marines decided
to leave under normal conditions. Comparisons between the two
studies could be drawn to assess whether Marines have
different reasons for taking VSI/SSB and leaving during
conditions of downsizing versus leaving the Marine Corps under
normal conditions.
Further study, using methodology similar to that used in
this thesis, could focus upon specific MOSs, or specific types
of duty categorized in greater detail. This study would
provide deeper insights from different perspectives. This
thesis attempted to focus upon quality, with inconclusive
results. Instead, focused studies using variables found
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statistically significant in this study, or variables found
having higher/lower-than-average take-rates in FY92, may
provide rich, invaluable insight into how better to modify or
redesign current Marine Corps VSI/SSB voluntary-separation
incentive policy. Further study may also determine that




MARINE CORPS FITNESS REPORT (1610)
This appendix contains the main portion of the Marine
Corps fitness report format, sections A through D.
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APPENDIX B
LARGE SAMPLE FREQUENCIES
This appendix contains the initial frequencies of all





DEPLTIME Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
5°00 64.7 5000 64.7
1 4"6 5.4 6396 70.1
2 346 3.8 6742 73. 9
5 562 4.0 7104 77 .«
4 115 3.8 74 4* 81 .7
5 239 2.6 7 68 7 84.3
6 357 3.9 8044 88.2
7 320 3.5 8364 »1. 7
8 238 2.6 8602 »4.3
9 1°4 2.1 8796 »6.5
10 169 1 .9 8°65 «8. 3
1 1 127 1.4 90<>2 9«
. 7
12 25 0.3 9117 100.0
21 1 0.0 •118 100.0
Cumulative Cumulatlvt
Percent Frequency Percent
3311 36.3 3311 36.
S
1 5807 63.7 9118 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
BLCK Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
6405 70.2 6405 70.2
1 2713 29.8 9118 100.0
Cumulatlvt Cumulative
OTHR Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
8520 '3.4 8520 «3.4
1 5"8 6.6 9118 100.0
Cumulatlvt Cumulat'vt
AOSPOUS Frtqutnev Ptretnt Frequency Percent
8591 94.2 8591 «4.2
1 527 5.8 °118 100.0
Cumulatlvt Cumulative
BOflNCITZ Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
82« 9.0 824 «.0
1 8294 91.0 9118 100.0
Cumulatlvt Cumulatlvt
DIVOBC Frtqutney Ptretnt Frtqutncy Ptrctnt
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MARRIED Fr equeney Percent Frequency Percent
1419 15.6 141<> 15.6
1 7699 84 .4 °l 18 100.
C umulatlve Cumulative
SINOL Freuincy Percent Frequency Percent
8487 "3.1 84R7 »3.1




NUMDEP Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
922 10.1 922 10.1
1 1291 14.2 2213 24 . !
2 1884 20...7 4097 45.1
5 2772 30.5 6869 75.6
4 1494 16.4 8363 92.0
5 545 6.0 8 a 08 »8.0
6 124 1.4 9032 90 .
4
7 47 0.5 9079 qq . 9
8 10 0.1 9089 ioo.o
9 1 0.0 • 0«0 100.0
10 1 0.0 90">1 100.0
Frequency Mlj$] nj • 27
Cumulative Cumul stive
DCTB_VRS Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
57:8 42.3 3728 42.3
2244 25.5 5974 67.7
! 1639 18.6 7613 86.3
1 662 7.5 82 75 93.8
( 229 2.6 8504 96.4
! no 1.5 8634 97.9
l 59 0.7 8693 98.5
r so 0.6 8743 99. 1
1 27 0.3 8770 99.4
» 18 0.2 8 788 99.6
> 11 0.1 8799 99.8
1 7 0.1 8806 99.8
I 7 0.1 8813 99 .9
1 3 0.0 8816 9 4 . 9
I 2 0.0 8818 100.0
I 1 0.0 8819 100.0
1 2 0.0 8821 100.0






AGE Frtqutncy Ptretnt Fr fiuf ncv P»rt«nt
24 15 0.2 15 0.2
25 50 0.5 65 0.7
26 00 1 . 1 164 1 8
27 164 1 .8 328 3.6
29 425 4. 7 753 8.3
29 7?8 8.3 1511 16.6
30 14^ 10.9 2505 27.5
31 °es 10.8 !4«3 .'8.3
32 «61 10.5 4454 48.8
33 »09 10.0 5363 58.8
34 °21 10.1 6284 68 .«
S5 7»2 8. 7 7076 77.6
36 634 7.0 7710 84 6
37 461 5. 1 8171 89.6
38 325 3 6 84«6 "3.2
39 214 2.3 8710 »5.5
40 144 1 .6 8854 •7.1
41 «6 1 .1 8«0 98.2
42 63 0.7 9013 98.8
4 3 52 0.6 •065 99 .4
44 28 o.J • «0«3 9° . 7
45 15 0.2 9108 99. 9
46 8 0.1 9116 100.0
48 1 0.0 9117 100.0




FIJLLDUTV Frtqutncy Ptretnt Frtqutney Ptrctnl
29 0. 3 29 0.3
1 9089 9«. 7 9118 100.0
Cumulttlvf Cumulttlvt
-
HSO Frtqutncy Ptretnt Frtqutncy Ptretnt
31 0.3 31 0.3




COLL Frtqutney Ptrctnl Frtqutney Ptretnt
8135 8«.2 8135 89.2




NIISO Frtqutncy Ptretnt Frtqutncy Ptretnt
908 7 99.7 9087 99.7
I SI 0.3 9118 100.0
112
Cumulatlvt Cumulative
TIG Frtqutncy Ptrctnt Frnufncy Percent
lr-45
975 10.7 975 10.7
1 863 9.5 1838 20.2
2 i:«o 13.6 3078 33.8
J 13°l 15.3 cc* 1* 43.0
4 1406 15.4 5875 6'. .4
5 1125 12.3 7nr)0 76.8
t 755 8.3 7755 85. 1
7 523 5.7 82/8 90 8
8 341 3.7 861" 94.5
240 2.6 8859 °7.2
10 160 1 .8 901« "8 9
11 44 0.5 «063 9° 4
12 32 0.4 °C°5 93
. 7
13 u 0.2 °1 11 99.9
14 6 0.1 9117 100.0
15 1 0.0 9118 100.0
Cumulatlvt Cumt/litlvt
VOS Frtqutncy Ptrctnt Frtqutncy Ptrctnt
i 57 0.6 57 0.6
7 115 1.5 172 1 .9
8 212 2.3 384 4 .2
9 336 3.7 720 7.9
10 765 8.4 1485 16.3
11 1406 15.4 2891 31 .7
12 1159 12.7 4C50 44 .4
13 1065 11.7 5115 56.1
14 912 10.0 6027 66. 1
15 875 9.6 6902 75.7
16 845 9.3 7747 85.0
17 605 6.6 8352 91.6
18 467 5.1 8819 96. 7
19 299 3.3 9118 100.0
Cumulatl/a Cumulative
FEMALE Frtqutncy Ptrctnt Frtqutncy Ptrctnt
8679 95.2 8679 95.2
1 439 4.8 °!18 100.0
Cumulatlvt Cumulative
SSBVSI Frtqutncy Ptrctnt Frtqutncy Ptrctnt
8187 89.8 8187 89.8
1 931 10.2 9118 100.0
Cumulatlvt Cumulatlvt
ADMIMSUP Frtqutncy Ptrctnt Frtqutncy Ptrctnt
6726 73.8 6726 73.8
1 2392 26.2 9118 100.0
113




CMBTABMS Fr equency Percent Frequency Percent
62*5 6".0 6295 6«.0




CSS_NT Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
8174 89.6 8174 89 6
1 «44 10.4 '118 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
C53_T Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
7768 85.2 7768 85.2




GAPSUP Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
8510 93. J 8510 93.3




ELECAVN Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
8117 89.0 8117 89.0




SECUR.DU Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
8696 95.4 8696 95.4




FMF_DU Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
4307 47.2 4307 47.2




NFMF_DU Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
7597 81.1 7397 81.1




RCTG_DU Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
8536 «4.2 8596 <>4.2
1 512 5.8 "118 1*0.0
Cumulative Cumulative
[NDEP_DU Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
sirs 8". 1 8123 8«. 1
1 005 10.' 01 18 100 .0
Cumulative Cumulative
SCH_DU Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
8181 95.0 8481 «3.0
1 657 7.0 '118 100.0
Cumulatlvt Cumulative
GTGCTTOT Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
80 139 1.5
81 15 0. 1














50 3 0.0 3 0.0
53 1 0.0 4 0.0
55 2 0.0 6 0. 1
57 2 0.0 8 0.1
60 5 0.1 13 0. 1
61 3 0.0 16 0.2
65 1 0.0 17 0.2
64 2 0.0 l« 0.2
65 9 0.1 28 0.3
66 1 0.0 29 0.3
67 5 0. 1 34 0.4
68 2 0.0 36 0.4
69 10 0.1 46 0.5
70 4 0.0 SO 0.5
71 14 0.2 64 0.7
72 4 0.0 68 0.7
73 47 0.5 115 1 .3
74 4 0.0 119 1 .3
75 49 0.5 168 1 .8
76 8 0.1 176 1.9
77 64 0.7 24 2.6
78 69 0.8 309 3.4
79 5 .0.1 314 3.4
453 5.0

















GTr;CTTOT Frequency Percent Fr(a u »ncy Percent
«6 247 2.7 2541 25. 7
07 72 0.8 2413 26.5
°8 205 3.2 2709 2°. 7
oa 145 1.6 285 3 31 .3
100 510 3 .4 3165 34. 7
101 36 0.4 51«« 55. 1
102 511 3.4 5510 38.5
105 117 1.5 5627 39.8
10'. 25? 2.6 5866 42.4
105 1«3 2.1 4059 44 .5
106 305 5.3 4364 47.9
107 110 1.2 4474 4«. 1
108 252 2.8 4726 51.8
109 275 3.0 5001 54.8
110 118 1.3 511* 56. 1
Ml 369 4.0 5488 60.2
112 279 3.1 5767 63.2
115 242 2.7 6009 65.9
114 207 2.3 6216 68.2
115 233 2.6 6449 70.7
116 276 3.0 6725 73.8
117 356 3.9 7081 77. 7
118 62 0.7 714S 78.3
119 236 2.6 737? 80.
•
120 103 1.1 7482 82.1
121 282 3.1 7764 85.2
122 75 0.8 7839 86.0
125 278 3.0 8117 89.0
124 118 1 .3 8235 «0. 3
125 110 1 .2 8J45 ?i .';
126 176 1.9 8521 93.5
127 51 0.6 8572 ?4 .0
128 62 0.7 8634 «4. 7
12? 25 0.3 8659 »5.0
150 121 1.3 8780 ?6.5
151 90 1.0 8870 ?7.3
152 29 0.3 809? ?7.6
155 55 0.6 8»54 ?8.2
154 6 0.1 8«60 ?8.3
155 81 0.9 ?041 00 .2
136 55 0.4 ?076 •9.5
140 1 0.0 •077 ??.6
143 12 0.1 «08? ?9. 7
145 16 0.2 9105 94 .
9
147 I 0.0 9106 9 9 . 9
152 5 0. 1 •111 04.9
155 6 0.1 9117 100.0




Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
5.5 1 0.0 1 0.0
4.9 1 0.0 2 0.0
5 1 0.0 3 0.1
5.4 5 0. 1 6 0. 1
5.5 2 0.0 8 0.2
5.6 1 0.0 9 0.2
5.7 2 0.0 11 0.5
S." 2 o.o 13 0.5
t 4 0.1 17 0.4
6.1 5 0.1 22 0.5
6.2 9 0.2 31 0.7
6.3 5 0.1 36 0.8
6.4 9 0.2 45 1 .0
6.5 5 0.1 50 1.1
6.6 5 0.1 55 1.5
6. 7 9 0.2 64 1.5
6.8 11 0.5 75 1.7
6.9 12 0.5 87 2.0
7 16 0.4 103 2.5
7.1 16 0.4 119 2.7
7.2 36 0.8 155 5.5
7.5 29 0.7 184 4.2
7.4 40 0.9 224 5. 1
7.5 46 1.0 270 6.2
7.6 59 1.5 329 7.5
7.7 70 1 .6 599 9.1
7.8 105 2.4 504 11.5
7.9 111 2.5 615 14.0
8 169 5.9 784 17.9
8.1 173 5.9 '57 21 .8
8.2 202 4.6 1159 26.4
8.5 269 6.1 1428 52.6
8.4 521 7.3 1749 59 .9








8.9 507 11.6 4058 92.5
9 329 7.5 4587 100.0
Frequency Milling • 4731
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Cumulat 1 ve Cumulative
DAU$_DR1 Frequency Percent Fr eiu?ncv r» r c ent
2:54 24.7 2254 24.7
747 8.2 3001 32. »
707 8.7 37«9 41.7
87<S 9.6 4 6 72 51.2
734 8. 1 5406 5".
3
610 6. 7 6016 66 .0
55S 6. 1 6571 72. 1
405 5.3 7056 77 .4
410 4.5 7466 81.9
331 3.6 77»7 85.5
10 257 2.8 8054 88.3
11 203 2.2 8257 90.6
12 157 1.7 8414 92.3
13 160 1.8 8574 94 .
14 153 1.7 8727 95.7
15 107 1 .2 8834 •6 .9
16 »8 1.1 8'32 •8.0
17 55 0.6 8 "8 7 "8.6
19 4» 0.5 9036 00 . 1
19 33 0.4 «06« 99 .5
20 24 0.3 9093 99.7
21 15 0.2 9108 99 .9
22 8 0.1 9116 100.0




ADD_PAY Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
7830 85.9 7830 85.9
1 3 0.0 7833 85.9
2 4 0.0 7837 86.0
2.2 106 1.2 7«43 87. 1
3 1 0.0 7944 87.1
4.4 151 1.7 8095 88.8
6 87 1.0 8182 8«. 7
».< 380 4.2 8562 93.9




P.EBONUS Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
2221 24.4 2221 24 .4




INMOS Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
2 388 26.2 2388 26.2
1 6730 73.8 9118 100.0
118
Cumulative Cumulative
E5 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
7484 8:. i 74S4 82. 1
1 1«!< 17.9 •>118 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
E6 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
<IM 45.4 4141 45 .4
1 4«77 54.6 »1 18 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative









1 2 0.0 5
2 55 0.6 60
3 123 1.3 183
4 162 1.8 345
5 176 I .9 521
6 136 1 .5 657
7 140 1 .5 797
8 136 1 .5 933
9 144 1.6 1077
10 1=8 2.2 1275
1 I 207 2.3 1482
12 212 2.3 1694
1! 258 2.8 1952
14 221 2.4 2173
15 203 2.2 2376
16 214 2.3 25°0
17 263 2 ° 2853
18 147 1 .6 3000
19 128 1.4 3128
20 192 2.1 3320
21 164 1 .8 3484
22 183 2.1 3672
25 179 2.0 3851
24 222 2.4 4073
25 211 2.3 4294
26 208 2.3 44«2
27 135 1.5 4627
28 141 1 .5 4768
29 177 1.9 4 945
JO 122 1.3 5067
31 72 0.8 5139
32 85 0.9 5224
33 156 1.7 5:80
34 145 1.6 5525
35 177 1 .9 5702
36 170 1.9 5872
37 164 1.8 6036
38 139 1.5 6 175











































TT_EAS Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
40 119 1.3 6410 70.3
41 134 1.5 6544 71 .8
42 79 0.9 662J 72.6
43 61 0.7 6684 73.3
44 66 0.7 6750 74.0
45 147 1.6 68 a 7 75.6
<« 130 1.4 7027 77.1
47 144 1.6 7171 78.6
48 106 t.2 7277 79.8
40 163 1.8 7440 81.6
50 157 1.7 75"7 83.3
51 129 1.4 7726 84. 7
52 84 0.9 7810 85.7
53 90 1.0 7900 86.6
54 92 1.0 79«2 87.7
55 59 0.6 8051 88.3
56 36 0.4 St>8 7 88.7
57 100 1.1 8187 09.8
58 68 0.7 8255 «0.5
5? 81 0.9 8336 91.4
60 66 0.7 8402 •2. 1
61 62 0.7 8464 92.8
62 87 1.0 8551 «3.8
63 50 0.5 8601 94.3
64 59 0.6 8660 95.0
f-*- 40 0.4 8700 «5.4
66 38 0.4 8 7 38 «5.8
67 40 0.4 8778 ««.3
68 29 0.3 8-507 96.6
6* 78 0.9 8<?«5 97.4
70 60 0.7 8 945 «8. 1
71 76 0.8 9021 •8
. 9
72 38 0.4 •05« 9° . 4
71 24 O.J •083 9'.
6
74 28 0.3 '111 99.9




TT_EAS"0 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
3 0.0 3 0.0
1
A 0.0 5 0.1
4 55 0.6 60 0.7
9 123 1.3 183 2.0
16 162 1 .8 345 3.8
25 176 1 .9 521 5. 7
36 136 1 .5 657 7 .2
4« 140 1.5 7«7 8 . 7
61 136 1.5 = 33 10.2
81 144 1.6 1077 11 .8
100 1=8 2.2 1275 14.0
121 207 2.3 1432 16.3
144 212 2.3 16«4 18.6
169 258 2.8 1°52 ' 21.4
1«6 221 2.4 2173 23.8
225 203 2.2 2376 " .-6.1
256 214 2.3 25«0 28.4
209 265 2.9 2853 31 .3
324 147 1.6 3000 32 . *
361 128 1.4 3128 34.3
6 00 t«2 2-1 3320 3 6.4
44 1 164 1.8 3484 38.2
484 188 2.1 3672 40.3
529 179 2.0 3851 42 . 2
576 222 2.4 4073 44 . 7
625 211 2.3 4294 47.0
676 208 2.3 4402 49 5
729 135 1 .5 4627 50.7
784 141 1.5 4768 52.3
841 177 1 .9 4<>45 54 .2
«00 122 1 .3 5067 55.6
'61 72 0.8 5139 56.4
1024 85 0.9 5224 57.3
1089 156 1 .7 5380 59.0
1156 145 1 .6 5525 60 .6
1225 177 1.9 5702 62.5
1296 170 1.9 5872 64.4
1J69 164 1 .8 6036 66.2
1444 139 1.5 6175 67.7
1521 lit 1.3 6291 6«.0
1600 119 1 .3 6410 70.3
1681 134 1.5 6544 71.8
1764 79 0.9 6623 72.6
1849 61 0.7 6694 73.3
19J6 66 0.7 6750 74 .0
2025 147 1.6 6897 75.6
2116 130 1.4 7027 77. 1
2209 144 1 .6 7171 78.6
2304 106 1.2 7277 79.8
2401 163 1.8 7440 81.6
2500 157 1 .7 7597 83.3
2601 129 1.4 7726 84.7
2704 84 0.9 7810 85.7
2809 90 1.0 7900 86.6
2916 92 1.0 79«2 87.7
3025 59 0.6 8051 88.3
3136 36 0.4 8087 88.7
3249 100 1.1 8187 89.8
3364 68 0.7 8255 90.5
3481 81 0.9 8336 «1 .4
3600 66 0.7 8402 »2.1




TT EA33Q Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
3844 87 1 .0 8551 9! 8
5»S« 50 0.5 8601 94.3
4094 5< 0.6 8660 95.0
42:5 40 0.4 8700 95.4
4154 38 0.4 8738 95 .8
4f.p« 40 0.4 8778 9* .3
4424 29 0.5 88 7 96.6
4761 78 0.9 8985 97.4
4900 60 0.7 8»45 98. 1
5041 76 0.8 9021 98 .9
5184 38 .4 •05« 99.4
53;^ 24 0.3 9085 ?9 . 6
5474 28 0.3 9111 99.Q
5625 7 0. 1 9118 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
F_RCTRDI Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
6689 75. 4" 6689 7J.4
1 2429 26. 4 9118 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
CEOBACH Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
6675 73.2 6675 75.
2
1 2445 26.8 9118 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative





560 5.9 360 3.9
87 1 0.0 341 4.0
«7 1 0.0 342 4.0
104 2 0.0 344 4.0
103 2 0.0 544 4.0
109 1 0.0 347 4.0
110 7 0.1 374 4.1
111 1 0.0 375 4.1
112 8 0.1 38 5 4.2
113 2 0.0 385 4.2
114 a 0. 1 393 4.3
115 4 0.0 597 4 .4
114 4 0.1 405 4.4
117 11 0.1 414 4.5
118 5 0. 1 419 4.4
11« 4 0.1 425 4.7
120 5 0.1 430 4.7
121 8 0. 1 4 58 4.8
122 2 0.0 440 4.8
125 9 0.1 449 4.9
124 9 0.1 458 5.0
125 12 0.1 470 5.2







































































































































































































The SAS System 12
Cumuletlve Cumula t 1 ve
PFT5C0RE Frequency Percent Frequency P.. r . n \
1°4 42 0.5 2--. 5 7 26.9
1°5 41 0.4 2 4*8 27.4
1"6 51 0.6 25 4 9 28.0
1«7 52 0.4 2**1 29 "
1»9 56 0.4 2617 28.7
1 °9 42 0.5 2659 2°,2
200 59 0.6 2718 29,8
201 4« 0.5 2767 !0.3
202 54 0.6 2821 30.9
203 60 0.7 2881 31 .6
204 48 0.5 2"29 32.1
205 51 0.6 2»80 52.7
206 59 0.6 303« 33.3
207 50 0.5 3089 35.9
:o8 56 0.6 3145 54.5
209 60 0.7 3205 55.2
CIO 59 0.6 5264 35.8
211 56 0.6 3320 56.4
212 51 0.6 3571 570
213 61 0.7 5432
.
57.6
214 45 0.5 3477 39.1
215 52 0.6 3529 30.7
216 55 0.6 3584 39.5
217 67 0.7 3651 40.0
219 50 0.5 3701 40.6
21* 50 0.5 5751 41 .1
220 52 0.6 3805 41.7
221 53 0.6 3856 42.5
222 58 0.6 5914 42.9
225 66 0.7 5»80 43.6
224 72 0.8 4052 44 .4
225 73 0.8 4125 45.2
226 60 0.7 4135 45.9
227 76 0.8 4261 46.7
228 68 0.7 4529 47.5
22? 46 0.5 4375 48.0
210 69 0.8 4444 48.7
251 54 0.6 44->9 49.3
232 68 0.7 4566 50.
1
253 62 0.7 4628 50.8
254 60 0.7 4688 51 .4
255 64 0.7 4752 52.1
236 56 0.6 48C8 52.7
237 70 0.8 4878 55.5
258 58 0.6 4936 54.1
23* 43 0.5 4979 54.6
240 70 0.8 5049 55.4
241 61 ' 0.7 5110 56.0
262 57 0.6 5167 56.7
2« 3 70 0.8 5257 57.4
244 62 0.7 5299 58.1
245 72 0.8 5571 58.9
246 67 0. 7 5433 59 6
247 64 0.7 5502 60.
J
24i 63 0.7 5565 61 .0
249 67 0.7 5632 61.8
250 78 0.9 5710 62.6
251 59 0.6 5769 63.3
252 77 0.8 584 6 64.1
253 78 0.9 5«2« 65.0
254 48 0.5 5972 65.5
255 76 0.8 6049 66.3
256 67 0.7 6115 67.1



















































ADDMOS Frtqutncy Ptrctnt Frtqutncy Ptrctnt
41«3 16.0 41«S «6.0
1 4925 54.0 9118 100.0
Cumulitlve Cumulttlvt
CONTEXP Frtqutncy Ptrctnt Frtqutncy Ptrctnt
259 70 0.8 62'.
«
25" 65 0. 7 6 3 14
260 67 0.7 6:81
261 61 0.7 6442
262 81 0.9 6*23
263 80 o.« 6403
264 75 0.8 6 6 78
2<5 69 0.8 6 7'-. 7
266 64 0. 7 6811
267 78 0.? 6899
268 69 0.8 4°58
269 66 0.7 7024
270 »4 1 .0 71 19
271 67 0.7 7 IPS
272 73 0.8 7259
273 81 0.9 7359
274 82 0.9 742 1
275 75 0.8 74'6
276 80 0.9 7576
277 77 8 7653
2 78 65 0.7 7718
279 92 1.0 7810
280 61 0. 7 78 7 1
281 77 0.8 7»48
282 74 0.8 8022
28 3 70 0.8 8092
284 71 0.8 8143
285 106 1 .2 826«
286 68 0.7 8337
287 73 0.8 8410
288 56 0.6 8466
28" 68 0.7 8534
2»0 65 0. 7 850Q
2<M 61 0.7 8660
2«2 61 0.7 8721
293 45 0.5 8766
2<>4 41 0.4 8807
205 31 0.3 8938
296 48 0.5 8886
2«7 34 0.4 8"20 .
2»8 26 0.3 8«46
299 17 0.2 8"63
300 155 1 .7 9118
885* 97.2 8859 97.2
1 259 2.8 9118 100.0
125
rhe SAS Sv< teii 1
Cumulative C umulatlve
PI_M Fr»flu«ncy Percent Frequency Percent
4731 51 .« 4731 51.9




NREBONUS Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
6897 75.6 68*7 75.6




NBORNCIT Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
8294 91.0 8294 91.0




N_INMOS Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
6730 73.8 6730 73.8




NJVDDMOS Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
4«25 54.0 4925 54.0




NODUTV Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
9089 99.7 9089 99. 7




This appendix contains all the frequencies of the smaller
sample. This sample was derived from the larger or original
sample. Observations in this sample were selected out based
upon the PI variable. Those observations not having the PI
variable have been removed.
127
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Cumulative Cumulative
DEPLTIME Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
2740 62.5 2740 62.5
1 258 5 9 2°«8 68.3
2 168 3.8 3166 72.2
J 172 1.9 3358 76.1
4 156 5.6 34«4 79.6
5 136 3.1 3630 82.7
6 188 4.5 3818 87.0
7 174 4.0 3«92 «1 .0
8 118 2.7 4110 '3. 7
9 94 2.2 420* 05.9
10 89 2.0 4295 «7 .9
11 79 1.8 4374 ««. 7
12 12 0.5 4386 100.0




CAUC Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
1532 34.9 1552 34.9




BLCK Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
3143 71.6 3143 71 .6




OTHR Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
4099 93.4 40»9 95.4




ADSPOUS Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
4129 94.1 4129 94.1




BOPNCIT? Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
591 8.9 391 8.9




DIVOP.C Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
4006 = 1.3 4006 «l .3




M4RBIED Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
671 15.3 671 15.
3
1 3716 84.7 4:87 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
SIHGL Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
4097 «3.4 4097 «3.4




NUMDEP Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
425 9.7 425 9.7
1 612 14.0 10J7 23.7
2 926 21.2 1963 44.9
I 1J41 50.7 3304 75.6
4 712 16.3 4016 4 1 . 9
5 265 6.1 428 l «7 . 9
6 64 1 .5 4345 «° .4
7 19 C.4 4364 9". 8
3 6 0. 1 4370 100.0
10 1 0.0 4371 100.0
Frequency Mljslne, » 16
Cumulative Cumuletl ve
DCTB.YRS Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
I 17(5 41.5 1763 41.5
I 1055 24.8 2818 66.3
! 776 18.3 3594 84.6
1 545 8.1 3959 92.7
i 120 2.8 4059 •5.6
> 82 1.9 4141 97.5
t 28 0.7 4169 '8 . 1
r J5 0.8 4204 «9.0
1 16 0.4 4220 99.3
1 8 0.2 4228 99.5
) 8 0.2 4236 «9. 7
1 5 0.1 4241 9« .8
? 3 0.1 4244 99. 9
1 1 0.0 4245 '* . 9
I 1 0.0 4246 100.0
i 1 0.0 4247 100.0
1 1 0.0 42 -.8 100.0
Frequency Mini n« • 159
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The SAS Svltem
Cumulative C umul ttl ve
AGE Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
z<- 11 0.3 11 0. 3
25 30 0.7 41 0.9
26 51 1 .2 °2 2. 1
2? 78 1 .8 170 3.»
2s 208 4 . 7 378 8 6
29 403 9.2 781 17.8
50 481 11.0 1262 :a .8
31 413 9.4 16 75 38.2
32 411 .4 2086 47.5
zz US 8.8 2471 56.3
:« 445 10. 1 2916 66.5
35 S'3 «.0 3:09 75.4
36 322 7.3 3631 82.8
37 243 5.7 18 79 88.4
38 173 3.9 4052 92 .4
39 116 2.6 4168 «5.0
60 7S 1.7 4243 «6.7
41 55 1.3 42 a3 «8.0
42 31 0.7 4329 98.7
43 31 0.7 4360 99.4
44 14 0.3 4374 90.7
45 8 0.2 4382 99.9
46 4 0.1 4386 100.0




FULLDUTV Frequtncy Perct nt Frequency Percent







HSO Frtqutncv Percent Frequency Percent
16 0.4 16 0.4




COLL Frtqutney Ptrctnt Frtqutncv Ptrcent
3970 90.5 3970 90.5




NH30 Frtqutney Ptrctnt Frtqutney Ptrcent
4371 99.6 4371 99 .6




TIC Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
2°0 6 .6 2"0 6.6
1 410 ">.5 700 16.0
2 56« 13.0 1269 28. •
3 6«2 15.8 1°61 44 . 7
4 726 16.5 2687 61 .2
5 6'.8 14.8 3335 76.0
6 431 «.8 3766 85.8
7 250 5. 7 4016 91 .5
8 178 4. 1 41«4 = 5.6
q 108 2.5 4302 «fl. 1
10 48 1 . 1 4350 qa . 2
11 16 0.4 4366 9« .5
12 15 0.5 437* «« .8
15 5 0.1 4384 9° . 9
14 2 0.0 4586 100.
15 1 0.0 4387 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
VOS Frerjency Percent Frequency Percent
6 56 0.8 36 0.8
7 71 1.6 107 2.4
8 «5 2.2 202 4.6
9 120 2 . 7 322 7.5
10 553 8.0 675 15.4
11 7«5 18.1 1470 55.5
12 502 11.4 1«72 45.0
13 38« 8.« 2361 55.8
14 577 8.6 2738 62.4
15 400 9.1 3158 71 .5
16 460 10.5 3598 82.0
17 555 7.6 J«31 8<".6
18 285 6.5 4216 «6. 1
19 171 3.9 4387 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
FEMALE Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
4200 95.7 4200 «5.7
1 187 4.3 4387 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
SS8VSI Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
5854 87.9 5854 87.9
1 535 12.1 4387 100.0
Cumuletlve Cumulative
ADMINSUP Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
3275 74.6 3275 74.6
1 1114 25.4 4387 100.0
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Cumulative Cumula t 1 ve
CMBfARMS Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
5152 71.4 3132 71 .4
1 1255 28.6 4 38 7 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
CSS_NT Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
5855 87.9 3855 87.9
1 sj: 12.1 4387 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
CSS_T Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
3492 84 2 3692 84.2
1 6°5 15.8' 4387 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
GASSUP Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
4124 94.0 4124 94.0
1 2(5 6.0 4387 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
ELECAvN Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
5959 88.0 3959 88.0
1 528 12.0 4387 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
SECUB.OU Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
4179 95.5 4179 "5.3
1 208 4.7 4387 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
FrtF_DU Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
2015 45.9 2013 45.9




NFMF_DU Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
3612 92.5 3612 82.3
1 775 17.7 4387 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
PCTC- DU Frequency Percent Frequency Perrent
<1<8 94 .4 4K9 °4. 6
1 23? 5.4 43B7 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
INDEP DU Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
3883 88.5 3883 89.5
1 504 11.5 4387 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
SCH_DU Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
4100 93.5 4100 93.5
1 287 4.5 4337 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
GTGCTTOT Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
53 1 0.0 1 0.0
55 2 0.0 3 0. 1
57 1 0.0 4 0. 1
60 2 0.0 4 0. 1
65 2 0.0 8 0.2
66 1 0.0 « 0.2
67 3 0.1 12 0.3
68 1 0.0 13 0.3
69 3 0.1 14 0.4
70 3 0.1 19 0.4
71 6 0.1 25 0.6
73 21 0.5 46 1 .0
74 2 0.0 48 1 .1
75 25 0.6 73 1.7
76 4 0.1 77 1 8
77 32 0.7 I0« 2.5
78 32 0.7 141 3.2
7? 4 0.1 145 3.3
80 70 1.4 215 4 . «
81 5 0.1 220 5.0
82 72 1.4 292 6.7
83 14 0.3 304 7.0
84 15 0.3 321 7.3
85 86 2.0 407 «.3
86 14 0.4 423 9. 6
87 95 2.2 518 11 .8
88 28 0.4 546 12.4
8" 89 2.0 435 14.5
•0 31 0.7 646 15-
2
91 23 0.5 68' 15.7
92 134 3.1 823 18.8
•3 37 0.8 860 19.4
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fTumulatl ve Cumulative
GTGCTTOT Freiueney Percent Freiuenev Ferceot
«4 121 2.8 «*1 22.4
«5 57 0.8 1018 23.2
96 114 2.6 1132 25.8
07 55 0.8 1167 26 .6
09 116 3.1 1303 29.7
«o 75 1 .7 1376 31 .4
100 156 3.6 1552 34.
101 15 0.3 1547 55.5
102 151 3.0 16 78 38.2
105 75 1.7 1751 59.9
104 116 2.6 1867 42.6
I OS <"4 2.1 1°«1 44 . 7
: 106 151 5.4 2112 48. 1
107 54 1.2 2166 49.4
108 111 2.5 2277 51.9
109 152 3.0 2409 54.9
110 58 1.3 2467 56.2
111 177 4.0 2644 60.5
112 140 5.2 2 784 65.5
113 110 2.5 28«4 66.0
114 95 2.1 2987 68. 1
115 124 2.8 5111 70."
116 154 5.1 5245 74 .0
117 169 5.9 5414 77.3
118 56 0.8 3450 7R.6
119 103 2.5 5558 81.1
120 48 1.1 5606 32.2
III 154 5.1 5740 85.5
122 38 0.9 5778 86. 1
125 136 5.1 5914 89.2
124 54 1.2 5°68 90.4
125 50 1.1 4018 91.6
126 77 1 .8 40«5 95.5
127 21 0.5 4116 93.3
128 25 0.6 4141 94 .4
129 11 0.5 4152 '4.6
150 62 1.4 4214 96. 1
151 48 1.1 4262 •7.2
152 16 0.4 4278 97.5
155 55 0.8 4311 98.3
154 2 0.0 4313 98.3
155 35 0.8 4348 99. 1
156 17 0.4 4365 • 9.5
145 6 0. 1 4371 99 . 6
145 8 0.2 4379 99.8
147 1 0.0 4380 09 .8
152 4 0.1 4584 aQ . 9




PI Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
3.5 1 00 1 0.0
4.9 1 0.0 2 0.0
5 1 0.0 3 0. 1
5.4 J 0.1 6 0.1
5.5 2 0.0 8 0.2
5.6 1 0.0 9 0.2
5.7 2 0.0 1 1 0.3
5.9 2 0.0 13 3
6 4 0.1 17 0.4
6.1 5 0.1 22 0.5
6.2 9 0.2 51 0. 7
6 3 5 0. 1 36 0.8
6.4 9 0.2 45 1 .0
6.5 5 0.1 50 1 . 1
6.6 5 0.1 55 1 .3
6.7 9 0.2 64 1.5
6.8 11 0.3 75 1 .7
6.9 12 0.3 87 2.0
7 16 0.4 105 2.3
7.1 16 0.4 1 19 2.7
7.2 56 0.8 155 3.5
7.
J
29 0.7 184 4.2
7.4 40 0.9 224 5.1
7.5 a 1.0 270 6.2
7.6 59 1.5 329 7.5
7.7 70 1.4 3«9 9.1
7.8 105 2.4 504 11.5
7.9 111 2.5 615 14.0
8 169 5.9 784 17.9
8.1 175 5.9 957 21.8
8.2 202 4.6 1159 26.4
8.5 269 6. 1 1428 52. 6
8.4 321 7.5 1 74<f 3».9
8.S 545 7.9 2094 47.7
8.6 441 10.1 2535 57.8
8.7 477 10.9 3012 69. 7
8.8 539 12.5 5551 80.9
8.9 507 11.6 4058 '2.5
9 329 7.5 4 38 7 ioo.o
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Cumulatlve Cumuletlve
DAUS.DBl Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
U25 25.6 1123 21.6
1 547 7.9 1170 35.5
2 582 8.7 1852 42 .2
j 3»2 8.« 2244 51.2
i 558 8.2 2602 5».3
5 2«5 6. 7 28'7 a .
« 258 5.« 5155 71 .«
7 251 5.3 5586 77 .2
8 187 4. 3 5573 81.4
9 177 4.0 5750 85.5
10 127 2.9 3877 88.4
11 107 2.4 3°84 = 0.8
12 76 1.7 4060 •2.5
15 85 1.9 4143 •4 .4
11 74 1.7 4217 "6.1
15 52 1.2 4269 97.3
16 44 1 .0 4313 '8.5
17 27 0.6 4340 =8.9
18 17 0.4 4357 9« . 3
l> 11 0.5 4568 99 .6
20 0.2 4577 •« .8
21 8 0.2 4 385 100.0
22 1 0.0 4586 100.0
25 1 0.0 4 58 7 100.0
Cumu latlve Cumulative
ADD.PAY Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
3799 86.6 3799 86.6
2 1 0.0 3800 86.6
r.2 53 1.2 5855 87.8
5 1 0.0 3854 87 . «
4.4 73 1.7 3927 8«.5
« 31 0.7 S»5S "0.2
6.6 174 4.0 4152 '4 .2
8.
8
255 5.8 4387 100.0
Cumu latlve Cumulative
REBONUS Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
1122 25.6 1122 25.6
1 326S 74.4 4 38 7 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
















E6 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
2804 «<!.0 2806 64 .
1 1581 56.0 4387 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative











1 O.tt , 0.0
1 2 0.0 3 0. 1
2 32 0.7 35 0.8
3 81 1.8 116 2.6
4 92 2.1 208 4. 7
5 106 2.4 314 7 .2
6 75 1.7 389 8.9
7 64 1.5 453 10.3
a 70 1 .6 523 11.9
Q 81 1 .8 604 13.8
10 114 2.6 718 14.4
11 121 2.8 83« 1V1
12 114 2.6 «53 21.7
13 140 3.2 10°3 24 9
14 119 2.7 1212 27.6
15 105 2.4 1317 30.0
16 122 2.8 14J9 32.8
17 144 3.3 1583 36.1
18 84 1.9 1667 31.0
19 59 1.3 1726 3".
3
20 97 2.2 1823 41.6
21 86 2.0 l»0? 43.5
22 106 2.4 2015 45.9
23 81 1 .8 2096 47.8
24 98 2.2 21»4 50.0
25 107 2.4 2301 52.5
26 106 2.4 2407 54.9
27 60 1.4 2467 56.2
28 65 1.5 2532 57.7
29 91 2.1 2623 59.8
30 47 1.1 2670 60.9
31 36 0.8 2706 61 .7
32 33 0.9 2744 62.5
33 72 1 .6 2816 64.2
34 79 1 .8 2895 66.0
35 66 1 .5 2»6l 67.5
36 77 1.8 3038 6°.
3
37 73 1.7 3111 70.9
38 66 1.5 3177 72.4
39 51 1.2 3228 73.6
40 51 1.2 3279 74.7
41 68 1.6 J347 76.3
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Cumulative Cumul a 1 1 'e
TT_EAS Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
42 35 0.9 ;;82 77.1
45 34 0.9 5416 77.9
44 33 0.8 *44« 78.6
45 67 1 .5 3516 80.1
46 45 1 .0 3561 81.2
47 72 1 .6 3633 82.9
49 44 1 .0 3677 83.8
45 61 1 .4 3738 85.2
50 56 1 .3 3 7 94 86.5
51 46 1 .0 !940 87 5
5; 33 0.8 1973 89 !
53 42 1 .0 3°15 8'.
2
54 37 0.8 3°52 "0 . 1
55 1? 0.4 3"71 or) .5
56 15 0.3 3086 90.9
57 47 1.1 4035 91 .9
58 26 0.6 4059 "2.5
59 36 0.8 4095 «3.3
60 25 0.6 4120 '3.9
61 23 0.5 4143 94 .4
62 30 0.7 4173 "5.1
63 15 0.3 4 199 95.5
64 23 0.5 4211 »6.0
65 14 0.3 4225 96.3
66 13 0.3 4239 96.6
67 12 0.3 4250 = 6 .0
68 19 0.4 4269 97.3
69 32 0.7 4301 98.0
70 25 0.6 4326 08.6
71 33 0.8 4159 0,/,
72 11 0.3 4370 00 . f,
73 9 0.2 4379 99.8




TT_EASSQ Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
1 0.0 1 0.0
1 2 0.0 3 0. 1
4 32 0.7 35 0.8
9 81 1 .8 116 2.6
16 «2 2.1 208 4.7
25 106 2.4 314 7.2
36 75 1.7 389 8.9
49 64 1.5 453 10.3
64 70 1.6 525 11.9
81 81 1.8 604 13.8
100 114 2.6 718 16.4
121 121 2.8 839 19.1
144 114 2.6 °55 21.7
lit 140 3.2 1095 24.9
.96 111 2.7 1212 27.6
225 105 2.4 1517 30.0
256 122 2.8 1439 52.8
28* 144 3.3 1583 56. 1
324 84 1.9 1667 38.0
361 59 1.3 1726 59.5
400 »7 2.2 1823 41.6
441 86 2.0 1909 45.5
484 106 2.4 2015 45.9
52* 81 1 .8 2096 47.8
576 »8 2 .
2
2194 50.0
625 107 2.4 2501 52.5




TT EnSSQ Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
729 SO 1 .4 2467 56.2
784 65 1 .5 2532 57.7
841 «1 2.1 2623 5°.
8
900 47 1 .1 2670 6n.9
061 36 0.8 2706 61.7
1024 38 0.9 2 744 62.5
1089 72 1 .6 2116 64 .2
U5« 7' 1 -8 23*5 66.0
1225 66 1.5 2 , 61 67.5
I29« 77 1 .8 3038 6" 3
1569 73 1 .7 3:il 70. 9
1444 66 1 .5 3177 72 .4
1521 51 1 .2 3228 73.6
1600 51 1 .2 3279 74. 7
1081 68 1.6 3347 76.3
1 764 35 0.8 3382 77.1
18'. 9 34 0.8 34 16 77.0
I 916 33 0.8 3449 78.6
2025 67 1.5 3516 80.1
2116 45 1 .0 3561 81 .2
2209 72 I .6 3633 82.8
2:o« 44 1 .0 3677 83.8
2401 61 1.4 3738 85.2
2500 56 1 .3 37«4 86 5
2601 46 1.0 3840 87.5
2704 33 0.8 3373 88.3
28 9 42 1.0 3915 8».2
291« 37 0.8 3952 90. 1
3025 19 0.4 3971 90.5
1136 15 0.3 3°86 00.9
5249 47 1.1 4033 91 .0
5564 26 0.6 4059 02.5
3481 36 0.8 40«5 03.3
3600 25 0.6 4120 •3 . 9
3721 23 0.5 4143 04 .4
3844 30 0.7 4173 05. 1
3969 15 0.3 4 188 05.5
4096 23 0.5 4211 06.
4225 14 0.3 4225 96.3
4356 13 0.3 4238 06.6
4489 12 0.3 4250 96 .9
4624 19 0.4 4269 97.3
4761 32 0.7 4301 98.0
4900 25 0.6 4326 98.4
5041 33 0.8 4359 09.4
5184 11 0.3 4370 99.
6
5329 9 0.2 4379 •9.8
5476 8 0.2 4387 100.0
Cumulative Cumulative
F_RCTRDt Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
3234 75. 7 3234 73.7
1 1153 26.3 4387 100.0
Cumulative Cu' uletlve
GEOBACH Frequency Percent Frequency P»rcent
3213 73.2 3213 73.2
1 1174 26.8 4387 100.0
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Cumul* t 1 ve
1
CumuleMue
PFTSCORE Fr equencv Percent Frequency Percent
1«0 4.3 1»0 4.3
97 1 0.0 l a l 4 4
104 1 0.0 1°2 4 . 4
108 1 0.0 1"3 4.4
1 10 5 0. 1 1*9 4.5
112 4 0.1 202 4.6
1 14 4 0.1 :o6 4 . 7
1 16 3 0. 1 209 4 9
117 8 0.2 217 4 .9
1 18 1 0.0 218 5.0
11" 2 o.o 220 5.0
ICO 2 0.0 222 5. 1
121 3 0.1 225 5. 1
122 I 0.0 226 5.2
123 5 0.1 231 5.3
ir« 5 0.1 236 5.4
125 5 0.1 241 5.5
126 7 0.2 248 5.7
127 10 0.2 258 5 .9
128 7 0.2 245 6.0
129 12 0.3 277 6.3
ISO 5 OM 282 6.4
III 8 0.2 2«0 6.6
1J2 9 0.2 2« 6.8
133 5 0.1 304 6.9
134 8 0.2 312 7. 1
135 9 0.2 321 7.3
136 7 0.2 328 7.5
137 10 0.2 338 7 . 7
138 6 0.1 344 7.8
13° 14 0.3 358 8.2
140 11 0.3 369 8 .4
141 13 0.3 382 8.7
142 12 0.3 304 ».o
143 10 0.2 404 .
2
144 9 0.2 413 9.4
145 18 0.4 431 9.8
146 14 0.3 445 10.1
147 8 0.2 453 10.3
148 10 0.2 463 10.6
149 18 0.4 481 11.0
150 17 0.4 4«8 11 .4
151 17 0.4 515 11.7
152 14 0.3 529 12.1
153 11 0.3 540 12.3
154 20 0.5 560 12.8
155 14 0.3 5 74 13.1
156 17 0.4 5°1 13.5
157 22 O.S 613 14.0
158 18 0.4 631 14 .4
159 13 0.3 644 14.7
160 15 0.3 659 15.0
161 17 0.4 676 15.4
162 17 0.4 6«3 15.8
163 12 0.3 705 16.1
164 10 0.2 715 16.3
165 27 0.6 742 16.9
166 15 0.3 75 7 17.3
167 8 0.2 765 17.4
168 23 0.5 788 18.0
169 17 0.4 805 18.3
170 17 0.4 822 18.7
171 14 0.3 836 18.1
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Cu nulttlvl Cu«iul»t lve
PFT5C0RE Frequency Pfrcent F "fluency Percent
172 15 0.3 851 19.4
173 15 0.3 866 1<>.7
174 11 0.3 877 20.0
175 24 0.5 '01 20.5
1 76 15 0.3 "16 20.'
177 13 0.3 q^O 21.2
179 1« 0.4 «48 21.6
17* 16 .4 '64 22 .
180 24 0.5 = 98 22.5
181 24 0.5 1012 23.1
182 17 0.4 1029 23.5
183 12 0.3 104 1 23.7
184 20 0.5 1061 24.2
185 12 0.3 1073 24.5
18* 24 0.5 ld'7 25.0
187 16 0.4 1113 25 .4
188 14 0.3 1127 25.7
189 20 0.5 1 147 26. 1
1«0 27 0.6 1174 26 8
191 16 0.4 1190 27.1
192 21 0.5 1211 27.6
19J 13 0.3 1224 27.9
1'4 25 0.6 1249 28.5
l«5 14 0.3 1263 28.8
l°6 22 0.5 1285 2'.
3
l«7 17 0.4 1302 29.7
I '9 18 0.4 1320 30. 1
19« 19 0.4 1339 JO. 5
200 33 0.8 1372 31.3
201 25 0.6 1X97 31 .8
202 28 0.6 1425 32.5
203 29 0.7 1454 33. 1
204 20 0.5 1474 33.6
205 25 0.6 1499 34.2
206 31 0.7 1530 34.9
207 24 0.5 1554 35.4
208 25 0.6 1579 36.0
209 26 0.6 1605 36.6
210 31 0.7 1636 37.3
2M 29 0.7 1665 38.0
212 26 0.6 16'1 39.5
2U 35 0.8 1724 39.3
2l« 18 0.4 1742 39.7
215 24 0.5 1766 40. 3
2U 27 0.6 1793 40.9
217 41 0.9 1834 41 .8
218 25 0.6 1859 42.4
219 28 0.6 1887 43.0
220 24 0.5 1911 43.6
221 25 0.6 1'36 44. 1
222 31 0.7 1'67 44.8
225 41 0.9 2008 45.8
224 26 0.6 2034 46 .4
225 36 0.8 2070 47.2
226 28 0.6 20°8 47.8
227 36 0.8 2134 48.6
228 3S 0.8 2169 49 .4
229 20 0.5 2189 49.9
230 27 0.6 2216 50.5
231 26 0.6 2242 51.1
232 33 0.8 2275 51 .9
233 30 0.7 2305 52.5
234 26 0.6 2331 53.1




PFTSCORE Frequency Percent Fr equency Percent
236 33 0.8 22">5 54.6
257 35 0.8 2420 55.4
229 28 0.6 2458 56.0
239 29 0.7 248 7 56.7
210 38 0.9 2525 57.6
241 35 0.8 2560 59.4
242 26 0.6 25"6 59 . •
245 29 0.7 2615 5->.6
244 31 0.7 2646 60.5
245 32 0.7 2 6 78 61.0
246 35 0.8 2711 61 .8
247 51 0.7 2742 62.5
248 52 0.7 2774 65.2
249 57 0.8 2811 64. 1
250 37 0.8 2848 64.«
251 26 0.6 28 74 65.5
252 37 0.8 2911 66.4
255 37 0.8 2 o t q 67.2
254 21 0.5 2<^," 67. 7
255 36 0.8 5005 68.5
256 35 0.8 3 040 69.3
257 31 0.7 5071 70.0
258 31 0.7 31 02 70.7
259 34 0.8 3156 71.5
260 34 0.8 5170 72.3
261 29 0.7 5199 72 . 1
262 37 0.8 5256 73.8
263 32 0.7 5268 74.5
:«, 31 0.7 5299 75.2
265 55 0.8 5554 76.0
266 26 0.6 3360 76.6
267 39 0.9 JJOQ 77.5
2 68 31 0.7 5450 78.2
269 28 0.6 5459 78.8
270 49 1.1 5506 70. 9
271 29 0.7 5555 80.6
272 35 0.8 5568 81.3
275 41 O.o 5609 82.3
274 55 0.8 3644 85.1
2 75 59 0.9 5685 84.0
276 45 1.0 5726 84 ">
277 51 0.7 3757 85. 6
2 78 29 0.7 5786 86.3
279 45 1.0 582" 87 3
280 27 0.6 2856 87.9
281 54 0.8 3890 88.7
282 54 0.8 5924 89.4
28 5 26 0.6 3950 °0.0
284 26 0.6 3976 •0.6
285 42 1 .0 4018 91.6
28 « 29 0.7 4047 92.2
28 7 51 0.7 4078 «3 .0
288 53 0.8 4111 93.7
289 26 0.6 4137 •4.5
290 26 0.6 4163 "4.9
291 29 0.7 4192 •5.6
2*2 50 0.7 4222 96.2
293 17 0.4 4239 96.6
2»4 14 0.5 4253 •6.9
2«5 11 0.5 4264 97.2
296 22 0.5 4286 97.7
297 21 0.5 4307 98.2
298 12 0.5 4319 •8.4
299 7 0.2 4326 •8.6
500 61 1.4 4387 100.0
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Cumulative Cumulative
AODMOS Frequency Percent Frequency P e r c e n t
:o;7 47.3 2077 47 . 5




CONT_EXP Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
4217 "6.4 4227 •6.4
1 1(0 3.6 4387 100.0
Emulative Cumulative
Pt_M Frequency Percent Frequency Percent




NREBONUS Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
3265 74 .4 3265 74 .4




NBORNCIT Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
39«« 91.1 3°°6 «1 . 1




N_INMOS Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
3327 75.8 3327 75.8




N_AOOMOS Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
2310 52.7 2310 52.7




NODUTV Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
4371 9«.6 4371 99.6
1 16 0.4 4 38 7 100.0
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APPENDIX D
RESULTS OF LINEAR PROBABILITY OLS REGRESSION MODELS
This appendix contains the results of four linear
probability OLS regression models used to detect multi-
collinearity within a multivariate model. Variance inflation
factors were used and are displayed. These results check, the
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lodel: MOOEL1






DF Squares Square F value
25 526.88469 14.21258 66.667













Parameter Standard T for HO;
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter ±0
INTERCEP 0.187220 07005274 2.65«
NODUTV
-0.0112'B 089I7«72 -0. 127
NHSG 1 0.017665 08607279 0.205
COLL 1 -0.048812 01658111 -2 ."44
F_RCTRDI 0.058402 01469665 2.615
PFTSCORE -0.000005427 00008575 -0.041
ADDMOS -0.0554«8 01196190 -2.800
DEPLTIME 0.001958 00171118 1 . 152
0CTB_VRS 0.002426 00529059 0.757
DAUS_DR1 -0.001121 00110916 -1.011
GECBACH -0.009846 01166246 -0.844
BLCK -0.026524 0U160<>8 -2.576
01 HR -0.002226 02055001 -0.109
DIVORC 0.011156 01800241 0.620
SINGL I -0.018554 02006°85 -0. "24
AGE 0.000854 00259915 0.548
FEMALE 1 0.005557 02569069 0.141
TIG I 0.006577 00286656 2.225
YOS I 0.00775' 00405552 1.915
ADD_PAV t 0.000605 00222225 0.272
REBONtrS I 0.005568 01177577 0.29,6
CONT_EXP 1 0.025528 029»5050 0.846
E5 1 0.472507 01697158 27.841






0015 1 . 10554802
00»0 1 . 743:2857















7 74 9 1 .05665752
5 9 74 1 .02868440
0001 1 . 75321167
0001 2.60566629
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Mod* I: MODEL1
D»oendent Variable: PI M
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square
Model 22 326. 10170 14.82294
Error 8 7«8 1874.15173 0.21325
C Total 8820 2202.25643
Root MSE 46179 R- square





Parameter Standard T for HO: Variance
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameters Prob > ITI Inflation
INTERCEP 0.200109 07044272 2.833 0044 0.00000000
MOOUTV -0.009306 08918711 -0. 104 «169 1 .00404366
NH3G 0.019404 08608099 0.225 8217 1 .004:8067
COLL -0.055133 01625091 -3.393 0007 1 .06144164
F_RCTRDI 0.036974 01447989 2.519 01 18 1 . 73982052
PFTSCORE -0.000021641 00008320 -0.260 7 = 48 1 . 1580 3834
ADDMOS -0.033036 01194127 -2.762 0058 1 .46060530
DEPLTIME 0.001954 00171142 t .142 2537 1 . 11169441
DCTB_YR3 0.002458 00329084 0.747 4551 1 .C8700533
DAUS_DR1 -0.001104 00110930 -0.997 3187 1 .06661321
GE08ACH -0.010380 01144088 -0.8«0 3734 1 .000:5059
BLCK -0.02573* 01115504 -2.307 0211 1 .07284406
OTHR -0.002124 02033301 -0.105 9147 1 .04884878
DIVORC 0.011339 01800487 0.630 5289 1 .06450736
SINGL -0.020728 02004046 -1.034 3010 I .06129962
AGE I 0.003297 00202^40 1.629 1034 2.14854216
FEMALE 0.000244 02343972 0.011 9911 1 .0600OJ40
TIO I 0.004530 00234549 4.043 0101 1.54153713
ADO_PAY 1 0.000401 00221999 0. 180 8568 1.31500151
REB0NU3 I 0.001420 01173345 0.121 9037 1 .04873927
CONT_EXP I 0.026951 02992279 0."01 3678 1 .02785767
E5 I 0.457819 01513724 30.245 0001 1 .30431819
E7 1 0.292434 01415397 20.441 0001 1 .65440049
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Modal 3* 61.85178 1.58594 1
Error 41*2 3*4. 25408 0.0*405
C Total 4231 456.10586
Root MSE J0667 R-squere 0.1356









PerametenO Prob > ITI
var l anea
Inflation
INTERCEP 0.626635 12050202 5 200 0001 0.00000000
NOOUTV 1 -0.054625 08252759 -0 662 5081 1 .01040066
NHSG 1 052KI 07*65674 655 5 128 1 .0084 14*8
COLL 1 -0.016155 0172*441 -0 •35 3509 1
.
16 86751
GTGCTTOT -0.000560 000J8515 -0 939 3477 1 .40207 7 15
PI -0.008253 00995477 -0 827 4083 1 .2130 1085
F_RCTRDI 0.009351 01450046 645 51*0 1 .82751442
PFTSCORE -0.000269 00008084 -5 329 0009 1 .24023565
N_nDDMOS 0.013944 01166816 1 195 2321 1 .526°6130
DEPLTIME -0.001188 00176014 -0 675 4**7 1 . 37437074
DCTB_VRS 0.000561 00500369 187 8519 1 . 10311*80
SECUR.DU 0.041552 02428924 1 711 08 72 1 . 1 7255970
NFMF_DU -0.001911 01464719 -0 150 8»A2 1 . 3O436350
RCTG.OU 0.022510 02741609 821 4117 1 . 752501OO
INDEP.DU 0.066153 01565788 4 224 0001 I . 13344843
SCH_DU -0.033173 0209*799 -1 580 1142 1 , I850:*87
0AUS_DR1 -0.001531 00110997 -1 579 1680 1 . 1368156*
N_INMOS -0.018716 01342621 -1 394 1634 1 .41105281
GE08ACH 0.004720 01133195 416 6771 1 . 13154871
BLCK -0.016830 oii7*832 -1 426 1538 1 .26603481
OTHR 0.018198 02060013 883 3771 1 . 17*91588
NBORNCIT 0.005149 01734219 2*7 7665 1 . 10605554
DIVORC 0.015998 01842748 868 3854 1.23101*54
SINGL 0.002950 02273125 130 8*68 1 .35032374
NUHDEP 0.003663 003*8774 *I9 3584 1 .51504604
AGE I -0.004270 00230*30 -1 849 0645 3.28446701
FEMALE I 0.035171 02573992 1 366 1719 1 .22608768
TIG -0.000736 00283689 -0 260 7952 2. 10521563
vos -0.016484 00408885 -4 031 0P01 6. 74604528
ADSPOUS 1 0.034776 021*4*13 1 584 1132 1 . l*5or831
ADD_PAV I -0.002141 00268195 -0 7 98 4 24 7 1 . O809O184
NREBONlfS 1 0.005166 01148081 450 6528 1 . 12458921
ADMINSUP I -0.002101 01444832 -0 145 8844 1 . 7954;«I8
CSS.T 1 0.107261 01617358 6 632 0001 1 .57797301
CSS_NT t -0.031522 01715338 -1 826 0679 1 .40565772
GARSUP 1 0.035942 0227«*25 1 576 1150 1 .3001 1471
ELECAVN I 0.087133 01824624 4 775 0001 1 .57*72137
E5 I ' 0.06*285 017368*9 3 "89 0001 2. 78660348
E7 1 -0.004746 01777395 -0 267 78*5 3.23681556
TT_EASSO -0.000028916 00000442 -6 544 0001 1 . 3644**33
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Sourc« DP Squares Square F value Prob^F
Model J8 60.32320 1 .58745 16.818 7.0001
Error <1°3 3'5. 78266 0.09439
C Total 4231 456. 10586
Root MSE .30723 R- square 1323
D»p Mean . 12287 Adl R- sq 1244
C.V 250 .03930
Parameter Estimates
Parameter Standard T for HO: Var 1 snce
Variable DF Estimate, Error Parameter^ Prob > ITI nf latlon
INTERCEP 0.570714 9.11991857 4.759 0.0001 00000000
NODUTY -0.056240 0.08267658 -0.680 0.4=64 1 01046685
NHSG 0.0638?$ 0.07974804 0.801
.
4 2 ' 1 1 00706466
COLL -0.003442 0.01703633 -0.202 0.8399 1 13109779
GTGCTTOT -0.000345 0.00038381 -0.8 a8 0.3693 1 40284180
PI -0.006279 0.00996103 -0.630 0.5285 1 21103384
F_RCTRDI 0.012007 0.01451181 0.827 0.4081 1 82374181
PFT3CORE
-0.00024J 0.00008073 -3.012 0.0026 1 23235994
N_arDMOS 0.014366 0.01168889 1.229 0.2191 1 52683825
DEPLTIME -0.001161 0.00176332 -0.659 0.5102 1 37435084
0CTB_YRS 0.000365 0.00300875 0.121 0.9034 1 10283127
secur_du 0.040851 0.02433276 1.679 0.0=33 1 17249965
NFMF_DU
-0.00295J 0.01467152 -0.201 0.8405 1 39;o2916
RCTG.DU 0.021657 0.02746510 0.789 0.4304 1 75239772
INOEP.DU 0. 0667=5 0.01568547 4.258 0.0001 1 13332379
3CH.DU -0.034097 0.02103489 -1.621 0.1051 1 1848=875
DAUS.DR1 -0.001476 0.00111190 -1.327 0.184 6 1 13644304
N_INMOS -0.020091 0.01344627 -1 .494 0.1552 1 410)4232
GEOBACH 0.005695 0.01134996 0.502 0.6159 1 13(03293
BLCK -0.017821 0.01181719 -1 .508 0.1316 1 26548482
OTHR 0.020039 0.02063249 0.971 0.3315 1 179C3612
NBORNCIT 0.004971 0.01737364 0.286 0.7748 1 10604831
D1VORC 0.013088 0.01844680 0.710 0.4780 1 22°13144
S1NOL 0.003123 0.02277252 0.137 0.8909 1 35031S°5
NUMDEP 0.002460 0.003=8378 0.617 0.5364 1 50655477
AGE -0.009120 0.00197475 -4.618 0.0001 2 39305522
FEMALE 0.044129 0. 0256»044 1.718 0.0859 1 21784463
TIG -0.006654 0.00243204 -2.736 0.0062 1 54160944
ADSPOUS 0.031612 0.02197496 1 .439 0.1503 1 19440007
ADD_PAY -0.001781 0.00268533 -0.663 0.5072 1 =7868541
NREBONUS 0.003016 0.01148926 0.263 0.7°29 1 12216332
ADMINSUP -0.005417 0.01445111 -0.375 0.7078 1 779651 10
CSS_T 0.105456 0.01619676 6.511 0.0001 1 57676379
CSS.NT -0.036480 0.01713668 -2.129 0.0333 1 39783581
GARSUP 0.030106 0.02279460 1.321 0.1867 1 29487489
ELECAVN 0.08«659 0.01826861 4.908 0.0001 1 57785757
E5 0.104 750 0.01500373 6.982 0.0001 2 0717»876
E7 -0.047881 0.01421857 -3.367 0.0008 2 06388246
TT_EASSO I -0 000025460 0.00000434 -5.865 0.0001 1 31313866
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APPENDIX E
HECKMAN MODEL CROSS-TABULATION TABLES
This appendix contains all the cross-tabulation tables
associated with the Heckman model's response variable
(dependent variable) PI_M, and the model's independent
variables.
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Col Pet 01 1 1 Total
4718 1 13 1 4731
51.74 1 0.14 1 51 .S9
a". 73 1 0.27 1
51.91 1 44.83 1
I 4371 1 16 1 4387
<S 7 . «-4 1 0. 18 1 48 . 1
1
•9.64 1 0. 36 1
48.09 1 55.17 1
Total 1089 29 «118
99. <8 0.32 100.00





Col Pet 01 11 Total
IS 1 4716 1 4731
0.16 1 51.72 1 51.89
0.32 1 99.68 1
48. S« 1 51.90 1
1 16 1 4371 1 4387
0.18 1 4 7.94 1 48.11
0.36 1 99.64 1
51.61 1 48.10 1
Totil 31 9087 9118
0. 1'. 99.66 100.00





Col Pet ' 0! 11 Total
4716 1 15 1 47S1
51.72 1 0.16 1 51.89
99.68 1 0.52 1
51.90 1 48.39 1
1 4371 1 16 1 4387
4 7.94 1 0.18 1 48.11
99.64 1 0.36 1
48.10 1 51.61 1
Totil 908 7 31 •118
•
9«. 66 0.34 100.00
150
Thf $AS S /stsm





Col Pet 01 1 Total
4 1 65 1 566 4731
45.68 1 6.;i 5 I .S«
88.04 1 ll .16
51. JO 1 5 7.58
1 3°70 1 417 4 19 7





TABLE OF PI_M BV F_RCTRDt




Col Pet 01 11 Total
J455 1 1276 1 4751
57.8' 1 15.99 1 51.89
75.05 1 26. 97 1
51.65 1 52.55 1
1 5254 1 1155 1 4387
35.47 1 12.65 1 48. 11
75.72 1 26.28 1
48.55 1 47.47 1
Total 6689 2429 9118
75.36 26.64 100.00






2116 I 2615 I 4731
23.21 I 28.68 I 51.89
44.73 I 55.27 I
50.47 I 53.10 I
2077 I 2310 I 4587
22.78 I 25.33 I 48.11
47.34 I 52.66 I








The SAS S v? t e m





Col Pet 01 1 1 Total
3462 1 i;s o 1 4731
37 .07 1 13.02 1 51 80
73.18 1 26.92 1
51.87 1 51.04 1
4387I 3215 1 1174 1
35.24 1 12.88 1 48.11
73.24 1 26.76 1
<;8. is r 48.06 1
Total 6675 2443 0118
73.21 26.70 100.00





Col Pet 01 11 Total
1 77" 1 2052 1 4731
19.51 1 32.38 1 51.89
37 60 1 62.40 1
53.73 1 50.84 1
1 1532 1 2855 1 4 38 7
16 90 1 31.31 1 48.11
34.«2 1 65.08 1
4*. 27 1 40.16 |
Totel 3311 5807 4118
36.31 63.60 100.00





Col Pet 01 11 Totel
3262 1 146* 1 4731
35.78 1 16.11 1 51.80
68.05 1 31.05 1
50. «3 1 54.15 1
1 3143 1 1244 1 4 38 7
34.47 1 13.64 1 48. 11
71.64 1 28.36 1
4*. 07 1 45.85 1









Col Pet 01 1 1 Total
47314421 1 310 1
48.4 9 1 3.40 1 51 .89
"J. 45 1 6.55 1
51.89 1 51 .84 1
4 38 71 4099 1 CS8 1
44. o* 1 3.16 1 48. 11
91.44 | 6-56 1
48 . 11 1 48.16 1
Totel 8520 5°8 «1 18
91.44 6.56 100.00





Col Pet 01 11 Totel
4524 1 407 1 4731
47.42 1 4.46 1 51 .8'
91.40 1 8.60 1
51.91 1 51.65 1
1 400« 1 331 I 4387
45.94 1 4.18 1 48. 11
91.32 1 8.68 1
48.09 1 48.35 1
Totil S 110 788 9118
91.36 8.64 100.00





Col Pet 01 11 Totel
748 1 3°SS 1 4731
8.20 1 4 3.68 1 51.89
15.81 1 84.19 1
52.71 1 51.73 1
1 671 1 5716 1 4387
7.36 1 40.75 1 48.11
15.30 1 84.70 1
47.29 1 48.2 7 1
Totel 1419 7699 9118
15.56 84 .44 100.00
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Col Pet 01 1
1
Total
45°0 1 541 1 4731
48.15 1 5.74 1 51 .8«
02.7" 1 7.21 1
51.7! 1 54.04 |
, 40 a 7 1 2°0 1 4 58 7
44. »5 1 5. 18 1 48. 11
95. 59 1 4.61 1
48.:? i 45. °6 1
Total 8487 651 '118
01.09 6.92 100.00





Col Pet 01 11 Total
4479 1 252 1 4751
4*. 12 1 2.76 1 51 .8"
94. 6? I 5.55 1
51.61 1 57.40 1
1 4200 1 187 1 4587
46.06 1 2.05 1 48. 11
«5.74 1 4.26 1
48.59 1 42.60 1
Total 8479 459 9118
95.19 4.81 100.00





Col Pet 01 1 1 Total
1099 I 5652 1 4751
12.05 1 59.85 1 51 .89
25.25 1 76.77 1
49.48 1 52.66 1
1 1122 1 5265 1 4 58 7
12.51 1 55.81 1 48.11
25.58 1 74.42 I
50.52 1 47.54 1









Col Pet 01 1 1 Tot»l
4376 1 555 1 4731
47.99 1 3.89 1 51.89
•2.50 1 7.50 1
58.4 7 1 21.73 1
1 SI 09 1 1279 1 4387
34. or i 14.03 1 48. 11
70.85 1 29.15 1
41.53 1 78.27 1
Total 7484 1*34 «118
82.08 17. ">2 100.00







1335 I 3396 I 4731
14.64 I 37.25 I 51.89
28.22 I 71.78 I
32.24 I 68.23 I
2806 I 1581 I 4387
30.77 I 17.34 I 48. 11
63.96 I 36.04 I










Col Pet 01 1 1 Total
5751 1 980 1 4731
41. 14 1 10.75 1 51.89
79.21 1 20.71 1
54.74 1 39. 09 1
1 2860 1 1527 1 4J87
J1.37 1 16.75 1 48.11
65.19 1 34.81 1
43. 24 1 60.91 1
Total 6611 2507 » i ia
72.50 27.50 100.00
TABLE OF PI_M BY CONT_EXP

















MAIN MODEL CROSS-TABULATION TABLES
This appendix contains all the cross-tabulation tables
associated with the Main model's response variable (dependent
variable) SSBVSI, and the model's independent variables.
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Col Pet 01 1 Total
3839 1 15 1 5854
87.51 1 0. 54 1 87.85
"a
.61 1 0.39 1
87.83 1 93. 75 1
1 5551 552 1 1
12. 1 J 1 0.02 1 12.15
99.81 1 0.19 1
1 12.17 1 6.25 1
Total 4371 16 4 58 7
99.64 0.36 100.00





Col Pet 01 1 Total
1840 1 14 5854
87.55 1 0.52 87.85
99.61 1 0.36
87.85 1 87.50
1 551 1 2 553
12.10 1 0.05 12.15
99.62 1 0.58
12.15 1 12.50
Total 4371 16 4387
99.64 0.36 100.00





Col Pet 01 11 Total
14 1 5840 5854
0.32 1 87.55 87.85
0.36 1 9«.64
87.50 1 87.85
1 2 1 531 533
0.05 1 12. 10 12.15
0.38 1 «9.62
12.50 1 12.15
Tote! 16 4371 4387
0.36 99.64 100.00
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Col Pet 01 1
3473 1 381
79. 17 1 8.68
90. 11 1 9.89
8 7.48 1 91 .37
1 4<>7 1 36
11 .33 1 0.82















Col Pet 3.51 4.81 51 5.<l 5.51 5.(1 5.71 S.9I 61 6.1
1 1 1 I 1 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 4
0.02 1 0.02 1 0.02 1 0.07 1 0.05 1 0.02 1 0.05 1 0.05 1 07 1 09
0.03 1 0.03 1 0.0J 1 0.08 1 0.05 1 0.03 1 0.05 1 0.05 1 08 1 10
100.00 1 100.00 1 100.00 1 100.00 1 100.00 1 100.00 1 100.00 1 100.00 1 75 00 1 80 00
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 1 o.oo i 0.00 1 02 1 02
0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 1 o.oo i 0.00 1 19 1 I«























13:60 Thursday. January 21.





Col Pet 6.21 6.31 6.41 6. SI 6.61 6.71 6.81 6.«l 71 7.11 Total
« 1 3 1 7 1 5 1 5 1 9 1 9 1 10 1 14 1 13 1 3854
0.21 1 0.07 1 16 1 11 1 0.11 1 0.21 1 0.21 1 0.23 1 0.32 1 0.30 1 87.85
0.2J 1 0.08 1 18 1 13 1 0.13 1 0.23 1 0.23 1 0.26 1 0.36 1 0.34 1
100.00 1 60.00 1 77 78 1 100 00 1 100.00 1 100.00 1 81.82 1 83.33 1 87.50 1 81.25 1
1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 533
0.00 1 0.05 1 05 1 00 1 0.00 1 0.00 ! 0.05 1 0.05 1 0.05 1 0.07 1 12.15
0.00 1 0.3S 1 38 1 00 1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.38 1 0.38 1 0.38 1 0.56 1
0.00 1 40.00 1 22 22 1 00 1 0.00 1 0.00 1 18.18 1 16.67 1 12.50 1 18.75 1
Total 9 5 9 5 5 9 11 12 16 16 4387
0.21 0.11 • 21 11 0.11 0.21 0.25 0.27 0.36 0.36 100.00
(Continue i)





Col Pet 7.21 7.31 7.41 7.51 7.61 7.71 7.81 7.91 31 8.1
31 1 24 32 1 40 1 49 1 55 1 82 1 95 1 142 1 148
0.71 1 0.55 0.73 1 91 1 1 12 1 1 25 1 1 87 1 2.17 1 3.24 1 3.37
0.80 1 0.62 0.83 1 1 04 1 1 27 1 1 43 1 2 13 1 2.46 1 3.68 1 3.84
86. 11 1 82.76 80.00 1 86 96 1 83 05 1 78 57 1 78 10 1 85.59 1 84.02 1 85.55
1 5 1 5 8 1 6 1 10 1 15 1 23 1 16 1 27 1 25
0.11 1 0.11 0.18 1 14 1 23 1 34 1 52 1 0.36 1 0.62 1 0.57
0.94 1 0.94 1.50 1 1 13 1 1 88 1 2 81 1 4 32 1 3.00 1 5.07 1 4 . 6°



























Th« SAS System 15:60 Thursday. J»nu»ry 21




Col Pet 8.21 8.31 8.41 8.51 8.61 8.7! 8.81 8.<>l 9 1 Total
162 1 2J5 271 294 384 428 488 1 4 78 1 314 1 3954
5.69 1 5. Jl 6. 18 6.70 8. 75 9.76 11.12 1 10. °0 1 7.16 1 87.85
4.20 1 6.05 7.05 7.63 9.96 11.11 12.66 1 12.40 1 8. 15 1
80.20 1 86.62 84.4 2 85.22 87.07 89.73 •0.54 1 «4.28 1 95.4 4 1
1 40 1 56 50 51 57 49 51 1 29 1 15 1 533
0.°1 1 0.82 1 .14 1 .16 1.30 1. 12 1.16 1 0.66 1 0.35 1 12. 15
7.50 1 6.7S 9.38 9.57 10.69 9.19 9.57 1 5 .44 1 2.81 1
19.80 1 13.58 15.58 14.78 12. 9J 10.27 9.46 1 5.72 1 4.56 1
Total 202 269 321 345 441 477 539 507 329 4387
4.60 6.15 7.32 7.86 10.05 10.87 12. 2« U.5( 7.50 100.00





Col Pet 1 01 11 Total
1 2794 1 1060 3854
63.69 1 24.16 87.85
72.50 1 27.50
86.39 1 91.95
1 1 «0 1 «3 533
10.03 1 2. 12 12.15
82.55 1 17.45
13.61 1 8.07









Col Pet 01 11 Total
2077 1777 3354
47 . 34 40.51 87.85
55.89 46. 11
8«.»! 85.56




Total 2310 2077 4 38 7
52. 66 47.34 100.00





Col Pet 01 1 Totil
3666 1 188 1 3854
85.57 1 4.29 1 87.85
95.12 1 4.88 1
87.72 1 90.38 1
1 513 1 20 1 533
ll.«« | 0.46 1 12.15
'6.25 1 3.75 1
12.28 1 ".62 1
Tot»l 4179 208 4387
95.26 4.74 100.00





Col Pet 01 1
1770 1 2084
40.35 1 47.50
45. «3 1 54.07
87.93 1 8 7.78





















Col Pet 1 0! 1 1 Total
1 J152 1 702 1 3854
71.85 1 16.00 1 87.85
81.79 1 18.21 1
87. 26 1 «0.58 1
1 1 460 1 73 1 533
1 . 4 9 1 1.66 1 12. 15
86.30 1 13.70 1
12.74 1 9.42 1
Total 3612 775 4387
82.33 17.67 100.00





Col Pet 1 01 11 Total
1 364« 1 210 1 3854
83.06 1 4.7' 1 87.85
96.55 1 5.45 1
87.85 1 87.87 1
1 504 1 29 1 533
11.49 | 0.66 1 12.15
94.56 1 5.44 1
12.15 1 12.13 1
Total 4148 239 4387
94.55 5.45 100.00





Col Pet 01 11 Total
3452 1 402 1 3854
78.69 1 9.16 1 87.85
8«.57 1 10.43 1
88.90 1 79.76 1
1 431 1 102 1 533
9.82 1 2.33 1 12.15
80.86 1 19.14 1
1
11.10 1 20.24 1
Totll 3883 504 4387
88.51 11 .49 100.00
163





Col Pet 01 1 1
3586 1 248 1
81 . 74 1 6.11 1
93.05 1 6.«5 1
87.46 1 95.38 1
1 514 1 19 1
11.72 1 0.43 1
°6.44 1 3.56 1








28 7 4 38 7
6.54 100.00














Total 3327 1060 4587
75.84 24.16 100.00





Col Pet 01 11 Totil
2820 1034 1 5854
64.28 23.57 1 87.85
73.17 26.85 1
87.77 88.0 7 1
1 3«5 140 1 533
8. "6 3.19 1 12.15
73.73 26.27 1
12.23 11. "5 1









Col Pet 1 01 1 Totnl
1 2757 1117 3854
t2.11 25.46 8 7.85
71 .0; 28. 98
8 7.08 89. 79




Totel 3143 1244 4387
71.64 28.36 100.00





Col Pet 01 1 Tottl
3607 1 247 3854
82.22 1 5.63 87.85
93.59 1 6.41
88.00 1 8S.76
1 492 1 41 533
11.21 1 0.«3 12.15
92.31 1 7.69
12.00 1 14.24
Totil 4099 283 4387
93.44 6.56 130.00





Col Pet II Totel
1364 I 2490 I 3854
31.09 I 56.76 I 87.85
35.39 I 64.61 I
89. OJ I 87.22 I
168 I 365 I 533
3.83 I 8.32 I 12.15
31.52 I 68.48 I














Col Pet 01 1 1
2508 1 ;^6 i
7°. «6 1 7.9« 1
91.02 1 8.08 1
87. 79 1 88.69 1
1 683 1 «5 1
11.12 1 l.OJ 1
«1
.56 1 8.46 1















Col Pet 01 1 Tot«l
J521 1 555 5854




1 «85 1 68 555
11.06 1 1 .09 12.15
90.09 I 9.01
12.11 1 12.60
Totll 6006 381 6 58 7
91.52 8.68 100.00





Cal Pet II Total
579 I 5275 I 5856
15.20 I 76.65 I 87.85
15.02 I 86.08 I
86.29 I 88.15 I
92 I 661 I 555
2.10 I 10.05 I 12.15
17.26 I 82.76 I














Col Pet 1 01 1 1 Total
3»541 5 6 08 1 246 1
8:.r«s i 5.61 1 87.85
"3.62 1 6. J8 1
88.06 1 84.83 1
5351 1 '89 1 44 1
11.15 1 1 .00 1 12. 15
<U . 74 1 8.26 1
11.94 1 15.17 1
Total 4097 290 4387
93.59 6.61 100.00





Col Pet 1 01 11 Totil
1 5697 1 157 1 3854
84.27 1 5.58 1 87.85
"5.95 1 4.07 1
88.02 1 85.96 1
1 1 505 1 30 1 533
11. 47 1 0.68 1 12.15
«4.57 1 5.65 1
11 . °8 1 16.04 I
Totel 4200 187 4387
95.74 4.26 100.00





Col Pet 1 01 11 Totil
1 5(56 1 218 1 3854
82.88 1 4.97 1 87.85
94.54 1 S.66 1
88.06 1 84.50 1
1 1 495 1 40 1 535
11.24 1 O.'l 1 12. IS
92.50 I 7.50 1
11.94 1 15.50 1




TABLE OF SCBVCI BY ADD PAY





Col Pet 01 21 2.21 31 4.41 61 6.61 8.81 Totll
:32« i 1 1 43 1 67 30 1 158 225 3854
75.88 1 02 1 °8 0.02 1 53 68 1 3.60 5.13 87.85
96 18 1 03 1 1 12 0.05 1 74 78 1 4.10 5.84
87.6! 1 100 00 1 81 13 100.00 "1 78 96 77 1 90.80 88.24
1 470 1 1 10 6 1 1 16 30 5 33
10.71 1 00 1 23 0.00 14 02 1 0.36 0.68 12.15
88.18 1 00 1 1 88 0.00 1 13 19 1 3.00 5.63
12.37 1 00 1 18 87 0.00 8 22 3 23 1 9.20 11 .76
Totil 3799 1 53 1 73 31 174 255 4387
86.60 02 1 21 0.02 1 66 71 3.«7 5.81 ioo.oo





Col Pet 01 11 Totll
2881 I 973 3854
65.67 1 22.18 87.85
74.75 1 25.25
88.24 1 86.72
1 384 1 149 533
8.75 1 J. 40 12.15
72.05 1 27.95
11.76 1 13.28









Col Pet 01 1 Total
2827 1 1027 3854
64.44 I 23.41 8 7.85
73. J5 1 26. 65
86.37 1 «2.19
I 446 1 87 533
10.17 1 1 .'8 12.15
8 3.68 1 16.32
13.63 1 7.81
Total 327J 1114 4 38 7
74. 61 25. 3? 100.00





Col Pet 01 11 Total
2679 1 1175 3854
61 .07 1 26.78 87.85
69.51 1 30.49
85.54 1 93.63
1 453 1 80 533
10.33 1 1 .82 12.15
84.99 1 15.01
14.46 1 6.37
Tot»l 3132 1255 4 38 7
71.39 28.61 100.00







Col Pet 01 11 Total
3331 1 523 3854
75.9] 1 11.92 87.85
86.43 1 13.57
90.22 1 75.25
1 361 1 172 533
8.23 1 3.92 12.15
67.73 1 32.27
9.78 1 24.75










5624 I 250 I 3854
82.61 I 5.24 I 87. S5
•4.05 I 5.97 I
87.88 I 87.45 I
500 I 53 I 5J5
11.40 1 0.75 I 12.15
"J. 81 I 6.1? I












Col Pet 01 11 Totil
3438 1 416 1 5854
78.37 1 9.48 1 87.85
89.21 1 10.79 1
89.09 1 78.79 1
1 421 1 112 1 533
9.60 1 1.55 1 12.15
78.99 1 21.01 1
10.91 1 21.21 1
Totil 3859 528 4387
87.96 12.04 100.00










I 484 49 555
11 .03 1 .12 12.15
90.81 9.19
12.56 9.21









Col Pet 01 1 1
2907 947 1
66. 26 21.5? 1
75.43 24.57 1
93.55 74.04 1

















Col Pet 01 11 Totel
2426 1'.28 1 3854
55.30 32.55 1 87.85
62.95 37.05 1
86.46 90.32 1
1 580 153 | 535
8.66 3.49 1 12.15
71.29 28.71 1
13.54 9.68 1
Tottl 2806 1581 4387
63. ">6 36.04 100.00
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Col Pet II Totll
2575 I 1479 I 3854
54.14 I 33.71 I 87.85
61.62 I 33.38 I
83.04 I 96.86 I
485 I 48 I 533
11.0* I 1.09 I 12.15
90.99 I 9.01 I












Col Pet II Tottl
3685 I 169 I 3854
84.00 I 3.85 I 87.85
95.61 I 4.39 I
87.80 I 88.95 I
512 I 21 I 533
11.67 I 0.48 I 12.15
96.06 I 3.94 I









LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS (MAIN MODEL)
This appendix contains the SAS Version 6 read-outs for the
computer running of the Main Logit model.
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WARMING: 155 obs er v 1 1 on ( s ) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables.






-2 LOG L 115 J . 78 2579.054
Score
Chl-Souare for Covarlates
574.72a with 3? DF tp=0.0001 )
576.974 with 39 DF (p=0.0001)
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Thf SAS Svsttm 16:50 Thursday. January
The LOGISTIC Procadura
Analysis at M ax mum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Maid Pr > Standardized Odds
Variable DF Estimate Error Chl-S<tuere Chi -Square Estimate Ratio
INTERCPT 1 .3°47 1 .3077 1.1375 0.2862 4 .034
wonuTY -1.0344 1 .0=71 0.8889 0.34S8 -0.032752 0.355
NHSG 0.8057 0.8255 0.9527 0.32«0 0.026402 2.2 33
COLL -0.3884 0.2302 2.8469 0.0915 -0.063146 0.678
GTGCTTOT -0.00421 0.00435 0.9369 0.5551 -0.033854 0.9«6
PI 0.00117 0.1025 0.0001 0. 9909 0.000355 1 .001
F_9CTRDI 0. J4J1 0.1949 3.0981 0.0784 0.083140 1 .40?
PFT3CORE -0.00247 0.00084 8.6857 0.0052 -0.088608
.
0<l 9
N_ADDMOS 0.J775 0. 1447 6.8011 0.0091 0.103909 1 .45 9
DEPLTIME 0.0057S 0.0185 0.04 15 0.8386 0.006460 1.004
DCTB_YRS 0.0270 0.0514 0.7592 0.3899 0.024550 1.027
SECUR_DU 0.4545 0.2789 2.6771 0.1018 0.052878 1.5 78
NFMF_DU -0. 1064 0.1688 0.5970 0.5287 -0.022288 0.8«9
RCTG.DU 0.1956 0.5080 0.4052 0.5254 0.024549 1.216
INDEP_DU 0.4974 0.1494 11.08 75 0.0009 0.087905 1 .644
SCH_DU -0.6451 0.2900 4.9465 0.0261 -0.086929 0.525
DAUS_DR1 -0.0251 0.0125 5.5191 0.0607
-0.0S7660 0.977
N_!NMOS -0.1678 0.1486 1.2752 0.2588 -0.058599 0.845
GEOBACH -0.0166 0.1257 0.0174 0.8O50 -0 .004050 0.»84
BUCK -0.5999 0.1458 7.7375 0.0054 -0.099131 0.670
OTHR 0.1514 0.2100 0.5200 0.4709 0.020750 1.163
NBOflNCIT 0.0405 0.1905 0.0447 0.8326 0.006350 1.041
DIVCRC 0.2662 0.1979 1 .8105 0.1785 0.041666 1 .305
SINGL 1 -0.1079 0.2598 0.2024 0.6528 -0.014337 0.8°8
NUMDEP 1 0.0515 0.0442 0.5014 0.4789 0.025132 1 .032
AGE 1 -0.0705 0.0242 8.4420 0.0037 -0. 145728 0.«32
FEMALE 0.472S 0.2497 3.5777 0.0586 0.052827 1.604
TIG 1 -0.0115 0.0506 0. 1421 0.7062 -0.015316 0.°8«
ADSPOUS 0.2866 0.2221 1.6655 0.1969 0.037118 1 .332
ADD_PAY -0.00942 0.0514 0.08«8 0.7645 -0.012849 0.991
NREBONUS 0.04 31 0.1208 0.1275 0.7210 0.010359 1 .044
ADM INSUP 0.0552 0.1856 O.P«02 0.7659 0.013259 1 .057
CSS_T 0.8800 0.1690 2 7. IT 72 0.0001 0. 177666 2.411
CSS.NT -0.2685 0.2109 1 .62C9 0.2050 -0.048243 0. 765
GAR SUP 0.4617 0.2528 5.5558 0.0678 0.060015 1.587
ELECAVN 0.8806 0.194 5 20.5559 0.0001 0. 157668 2.412
E5 2.8448 0.6347 20.0926 0.0001 0.710692 17. 1«8
E7 -0.2559 0.5002 0.7266 0.5940 -0.067338 C. 774
TT_EASSO -0.0004 0.000065 59.1422 0.0001 -0.277382 .000
BIAS
-0.7I5« 0.1922 13.7764 0.0002 -0.523572 :.4io
Association at Prtdlctad Probablll 1 1 as and Observed Responses
Concordant • 79 tx Somers" 596
Discordant • 20 0% Gamma • 598
Tlad 4\ Tau-a • 128






Co -rect Incorrect Percentages
Prob Non- Non- Sensl- Speci- False False
Level Event Event Event Event Correct tivltv ficity POS NEG
0.000 520 3712 12.5 100.0 0.0 87.7
0.020 498 600 5112 22 25.9 95.8 16.2 86.2 3.5
0.040 474 1590 2522 46 44 .0 91.2 37.4 85.0 3.2
0.060 451 1876 1856 69 55.0 86.7 50.5 80.5 3.5
0.080 427 2168 1544 93 61.3 82.1 58.4 78.5 4.1
0.100 410 2 5 78 1354 110 65.9 78.8 64.1 76.5 4.4
0.120 395 2565 1147 125 69.9 76.0 69.1 74.4 4.6
0.140 565 2729 983 15' 73.1 69.8 75.5 73.0 5.4
0.160 J!8 2861 851 182 75.6 65.0 77.1 71.6 6.0
0.180 506 2989 723 214 77.9 58.8 80.5 70.5 6.7
0.200 28 5 5099 613 237 79.9 54.4 83.5 68.4 7. 1
0.220 257 5191 521 265 81.5 49.4 86.0 67.0 7.6
0.240 245 5262 450 277 82.8 46. 7 87.9 64.9 7.8
0.260 250 5542 370 290 84.4 44.2 90.0 61.7 8.0
0.280 209 5592 320 511 8S.1 40.2 91.4 60.5 8.4
0.500 187 5446 266 555 85.8 36.0 92.8 58.7 8.8
0.520 169 5495 219 351 86.5 52.5 94. 1 56.4 9.1
0.560 147 5551 181 575 86.9 28.5 95.1 55.2 9.6
0.560 154 5567 145 586 87.5 25.8 »6.1 52.0 9.8
0.580 119 5597 115 401 87.8 22.9 °6.9 49.1 10.0
0.400 104 5614 98 416 87.9 20.0 «7 .4 48.5 10.3
0.420 90 5655 79 430 88.0 17.5 97.9 46.7 10 .6
0.440 76 5645 67 444 87.9 14.6 98.2 46.9 10.9
0.460 69 5657 55 451 88.0 15.5 98.5 44 .4 11 .0
0.480 59 5666 46 461 88.0 11.5 °8.8 43.8 11.2
0.500 55 5676 56 467 88.1 10.2 99.0 40.4 11.5
0.520 45 568J 29 477 88.0 8.3 99.2 40.3 11 .5
0.540 57 5688 24 483 88.0 7.1 99.4 39.5 11 .6
0.560 52 5691 21 488 88.0 6.2 99.4 59.6 11.7
0.580 28 5695 19 492 87.9 5.4 99.5 40.4 11.8
0.600 24 5696 16 496 87.9 4.6 99.6 40.0 11.8
0.620 21 5702 10 499 88.0 4.0 99.7 52.5 11.9
0.640 16 5704 8 504 87.9 3.1 99.8 55.5 12.0
0.660 12 5 708 4 508 87.9 2.3 99.9 25.0 12.0
0.680 10 5709 5 510 87.9 1.9 90 . 9 25.1 12.1
0.700 8 5709 3 512 87.8 1.5 99.9 27.5 12.1
0.720 5 5709 3 515 87.8 1.0 99.9 37.5 12.2
0.740 5 5710 2 517 87.7 0.6 99.9 40.0 12.2
0.760 2 5710 2 518 87.7 0.4 99.9 50.0 12.5
0.780 1 5712 519 87.7 0.2 100.0 0.0 12.3
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